Author's Keywords: Congress, bureaucracy, oversight, legislative veto, presidential veto, signing statement	Convention Convention is an application service for managing large or small academic conferences, annual meetings, and other types of events! Submission - Custom fields, multiple submission types, tracks, audio visual, multiple upload formats, automatic conversion to pdf. Review - Peer Review, Bulk reviewer assignment, bulk emails, ranking, z-score statistics, and multiple worksheets! Reports - Many standard and custom reports generated while you wait. Print programs with participant indexes, event grids, and more! Scheduling - Flexible and convenient grid scheduling within rooms and buildings. Conflict checking and advanced filtering. Communication - Bulk email tools to help your administrators send reminders and responses. Use form letters, a message center, and much more! Management - Search tools, duplicate people management, editing tools, submission transfers, many tools to manage a variety of conference management headaches! Click here for more information.
Association: Name: American Political Science Association URL: http://www.apsanet.org
Citation: URL: http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p209479_index.html Direct Link: HTML Code:

Berry, Michael. "Beyond Chadha: The Modern Legislative Veto as Macropolitical Conflict" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Hyatt Regency Chicago and the Sheraton Chicago Hotel and Towers, Chicago, IL, Aug 30, 2007 <Not Available>. 2011-06-08 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p209479_index.html>

Berry, M. J. , 2007-08-30 "Beyond Chadha: The Modern Legislative Veto as Macropolitical Conflict" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Hyatt Regency Chicago and the Sheraton Chicago Hotel and Towers, Chicago, IL Online <APPLICATION/PDF>. 2011-06-08 from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p209479_index.html

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript Abstract: The analysis presented in this paper focuses on the modern legislative veto as an important means of both ex ante and ex post congressional oversight as well as an increasingly significant context for institutional conflict between the legislative and executive branches. In order to better understand the dynamics of this conflict, a series of macropolitical hypotheses are tested using an original data set of legislative veto provisions from 1993–2006. Issues considered include the effect of multiple principals on the quantity of legislative veto proposals, the effect of legislative veto provisions on the likelihood of presidential veto, and the use of presidential signing statements as a strategic executive separation of powers defense.

Assessing Presidential Power: Veto Politics and Presidential Signing Statements as Coordinated Strategies

Administrators, Legislators, and Presidents: Are Cabinet Secretaries Ideologically Closer to Congress or the President?