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Association: Name: American Political Science Association URL: http://www.apsanet.org
Citation: URL: http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p209498_index.html Direct Link: HTML Code:

Rubin, Jacqueline. "Delegating Death: A Strategic Logic of Government Killing" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Hyatt Regency Chicago and the Sheraton Chicago Hotel and Towers, Chicago, IL, Aug 30, 2007 <Not Available>. 2011-06-08 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p209498_index.html>

Rubin, J. H. , 2007-08-30 "Delegating Death: A Strategic Logic of Government Killing" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Hyatt Regency Chicago and the Sheraton Chicago Hotel and Towers, Chicago, IL Online <APPLICATION/PDF>. 2011-06-08 from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p209498_index.html

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript Abstract: An established line of research demonstrates that context is an important influence on civilian death tolls. Variance in observed body counts thus presents a puzzle. Why do noncombatant body counts vary even when states face similar conditions and incentives to kill? I argue that the relationships between governments and the perpetrators receiving the killing order are central to understanding this puzzle. The decision to kill is a function of the conditions and incentives governments face, and of the government’s beliefs about what will happen once it decides to kill. Once the decision is made, it must be implemented: somebody needs to pull the trigger. Perpetrators who obey the order may face punishment for killing by international actors. At the same time, perpetrators who disobey the killing order risk punishment by the government. Using a game-theoretic model, I identify circumstances under which death tolls may vary even when states faces similar conditions and incentives to kill. I also find ample support for the claim that observed killing is the outcome of a strategic interaction between government and perpetrator.

To Kill or Not to Kill?: The Effectiveness of Targeting Civilians in Internal Conflict

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International Private Enemy Number One: The ?Pirate? as the Apolitical Enemy of the International Order