Author's Keywords: China, legal institutions, law and society, land, property rights,	Convention All Academic Convention is the premier solution for your association's abstract management solutions needs. Submission - Custom fields, multiple submission types, tracks, audio visual, multiple upload formats, automatic conversion to pdf. Review - Peer Review, Bulk reviewer assignment, bulk emails, ranking, z-score statistics, and multiple worksheets! Reports - Many standard and custom reports generated while you wait. Print programs with participant indexes, event grids, and more! Scheduling - Flexible and convenient grid scheduling within rooms and buildings. Conflict checking and advanced filtering. Communication - Bulk email tools to help your administrators send reminders and responses. Use form letters, a message center, and much more! Management - Search tools, duplicate people management, editing tools, submission transfers, many tools to manage a variety of conference management headaches! Click here for more information.
Association: Name: American Political Science Association URL: http://www.apsanet.org
Citation: URL: http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p209847_index.html Direct Link: HTML Code:

Heurlin, Christopher. and Whiting, Susan. "Villagers Against the State: The Politics of Land Seizures in Rural China" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Hyatt Regency Chicago and the Sheraton Chicago Hotel and Towers, Chicago, IL, Aug 30, 2007 <Not Available>. 2011-06-08 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p209847_index.html>

Heurlin, C. and Whiting, S. , 2007-08-30 "Villagers Against the State: The Politics of Land Seizures in Rural China" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Hyatt Regency Chicago and the Sheraton Chicago Hotel and Towers, Chicago, IL Online <APPLICATION/PDF>. 2011-06-08 from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p209847_index.html

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript Abstract: In recent years, disputes over land have become an important source of social and political instability. At the end of 2005, as many as 20 villagers were reported killed by the Chinese police in Shanwei, Guangdong, after they rose up to protest the seizure of their lands, in what may have been the single bloodiest incident in China since the suppression of the Tiananmen protests in 1989. Seeking to contain rural conflict, the state has maintained and created an expanding array of institutions to perform dispute resolution in the countryside, including letters and visits offices housed in multiple government bureaus and mass organizations, multiple entities with responsibility for mediating disputes (including but not limited to the local justice bureaus and their associated legal aid centers), new rural arbitration commissions, and, of course, the courts. Some villagers turn to these legal and political institutions, filing petitions, participating in government-sponsored mediation efforts, requesting hearings, arbitrating, or filing law suits. In most cases, however, villagers appear to take no action at all, electing instead to �lump� their dispute and simply accepted the compensation offered by the local government. How do villagers make use of these dispute resolution mechanisms? What is it about the villagers, the nature of the dispute, or the actions of the state that prompts some villagers to ask for a hearing or file a petition? Are more �rights conscious� villagers more likely to take action? Do certain types of land compensation schemes cause more social conflicts? Does being consulted on the amount of compensation make villagers less likely to take action? We examine these questions using a 17 province survey from 2005 covering 1,900 households. Our findings challenge the conventional wisdom that rights consciousness leads to higher levels of legal mobilization. By contrast, we show that the highly rights conscious are less likely to file petitions. We also show that consultation with villagers over compensation--a tactic introduced by the central government to diffuse social conflict--actually makes villagers more likely to demand a public hearing on compensation. The most powerful predictor of dispute escalation, however, is the type of compensation scheme. Compensation packages that give benefits to all farmers in a villager--rather than only those whose land was taken--lead to far more petitions and demands for public hearings than compensation packages that give compensation only to affected villagers. Finally, we supplement and explore the dynamics of these findings through case studies conducted in Shandong and Hunan in 2007.

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