Author's Keywords: welfare reform, pensions, institutional change, state-society relations, authority	Convention All Academic Convention makes running your annual conference simple and cost effective. It is your online solution for abstract management, peer review, and scheduling for your annual meeting or convention. Submission - Custom fields, multiple submission types, tracks, audio visual, multiple upload formats, automatic conversion to pdf. Review - Peer Review, Bulk reviewer assignment, bulk emails, ranking, z-score statistics, and multiple worksheets! Reports - Many standard and custom reports generated while you wait. Print programs with participant indexes, event grids, and more! Scheduling - Flexible and convenient grid scheduling within rooms and buildings. Conflict checking and advanced filtering. Communication - Bulk email tools to help your administrators send reminders and responses. Use form letters, a message center, and much more! Management - Search tools, duplicate people management, editing tools, submission transfers, many tools to manage a variety of conference management headaches! Click here for more information.
Association: Name: American Political Science Association URL: http://www.apsanet.org
Citation: URL: http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p209975_index.html Direct Link: HTML Code:

Vail, Mark. "Ideas of Order: Institutional Dynamics and the Shifting Politics of Pension Reform in France and Germany" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Hyatt Regency Chicago and the Sheraton Chicago Hotel and Towers, Chicago, IL, Aug 30, 2007 <Not Available>. 2011-06-09 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p209975_index.html>

Vail, M. I. , 2007-08-30 "Ideas of Order: Institutional Dynamics and the Shifting Politics of Pension Reform in France and Germany" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Hyatt Regency Chicago and the Sheraton Chicago Hotel and Towers, Chicago, IL Online <PDF>. 2011-06-09 from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p209975_index.html

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript Abstract: Through an analysis of recent pension reforms in France and Germany, this paper argues that the advent of a climate of economic austerity has driven shifts in both the character of political bargaining and the substance of policies in the two countries. Not only have France and Germany continued to reform their pension systems, in contrast to popular conceptions of �frozen� continental European welfare states, the very political arrangements that many scholars have blamed for policy sclerosis in the two countries�dysfunctional statism in France and moribund neocorporatism in Germany�have likewise continued to evolve. More generally, the paper calls into question the common claim that pension reform tends to take place through negotiation and consensus. It argues instead that successful pension reform has followed an approach of �strategic unilateralism,� which involves government imposition of reform but in ways that account for the political assets and liabilities created by the institutional and political contexts in question. The paper concludes that formal distributions of political authority may provide very misleading guidelines for both understanding political dynamics and predicting policy outcomes.

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