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Imagining War in Two Eras of Globalization |
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Abstract:
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Historians and political scientists agree that globalization is not a new phenomenon. Between 1850 and 1914, freedom of trade, capital transfers, changes in transportation and communication technologies, as well as international migrations, all worked to affect threat perceptions and conceptions of military power. Prominent work by economic historians on the so-called first globalization (Bordo, Williamson) provided a welcome interdisciplinary dialogue with more recent work by IPE scholars on the current globalization and its alleged consequences. At the same time, the historiography of the pre-1914 international system is bringing together more and more international political economy issues and international security dynamics, including changes in military power (Stevenson, Ferguson, Strachan). These more recent work point out that military and naval professionals made assumptions about the workings of commercial and trading interdependencies which influenced their perceptions of strategic strength and vulnerability. Yet, at this point, few political scientists have engaged in that debate on the strategic implications of globalization both before 1914 and today. The goal of this paper is to do precisely that.
Why, and how, does the greater interconnectedness of the international system shaped military strategy in two different periods, before 1914 and today? Some strategists acknowledged that this greater interconnectedness led to a decline of the utility of force. Others, however, saw new, unsettling, opportunities for using force. Why does globalization constrain military strategists in some cases, and enable them in others?
I argue that the impact of globalization on strategy is likely to depend on strategists perceptions of globalization and on their conception of the military profession. Borrowing from the resource dependency approach in organization theory, I show that strategists can adapt to globalization in four different ways: (1) strategists can accommodate the demands of globalization on the military’s core competency, and redefine the armed forces’ roles and missions; (2) strategists can refuse to accommodate, and attempt to shape globalization instead; (3) strategists can define a new desired equilibrium between military power’s imperative and globalization; (4), or strategists can allow the existing balance to prevail.
The goal of the paper is to identify and compare the varied responses of land and naval power leading strategists to the increasing demands of globalization on military power in two different eras. I ask if, and to what extent, they thought in terms of the potential impact of globalization when they planned for the employment of military power. Were strategists in both eras aware of globalization dynamics, and did they worry similarly or differently about their consequences on strategy? Were they intellectually well-equipped to integrate economic and technological challenges to military planning? Did they define and conceptualize globalization in similar or different ways during both periods? How did they take it into account when they design military doctrine?
By engaging with the renewal of the historiography of the pre-1914 international system, I hope to contribute to a stimulating interdisciplinary debate at the intersection of history and international politics. |
Most Common Document Word Stems:
global (190), war (150), militari (142), power (104), ed (99), press (98), intern (84), world (76), univers (74), new (70), de (69), la (66), polit (62), naval (57), strategi (51), 1st (50), pp (46), strateg (45), forc (43), system (41), princeton (39), |
Author's Keywords:
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Globalization, Military Strategy, Land power, Naval power, Army, Navy, World War I, Ressource dependency, Liberalism |
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Association:
Name: American Political Science Association URL: http://www.apsanet.org
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Citation:
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MLA Citation:
| Vennesson, Pascal. "Imagining War in Two Eras of Globalization" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Hyatt Regency Chicago and the Sheraton Chicago Hotel and Towers, Chicago, IL, Aug 30, 2007 <Not Available>. 2011-06-08 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p210069_index.html> |
APA Citation:
| Vennesson, P. , 2007-08-30 "Imagining War in Two Eras of Globalization" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Hyatt Regency Chicago and the Sheraton Chicago Hotel and Towers, Chicago, IL Online <PDF>. 2011-06-08 from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p210069_index.html |
Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript Abstract: Historians and political scientists agree that globalization is not a new phenomenon. Between 1850 and 1914, freedom of trade, capital transfers, changes in transportation and communication technologies, as well as international migrations, all worked to affect threat perceptions and conceptions of military power. Prominent work by economic historians on the so-called first globalization (Bordo, Williamson) provided a welcome interdisciplinary dialogue with more recent work by IPE scholars on the current globalization and its alleged consequences. At the same time, the historiography of the pre-1914 international system is bringing together more and more international political economy issues and international security dynamics, including changes in military power (Stevenson, Ferguson, Strachan). These more recent work point out that military and naval professionals made assumptions about the workings of commercial and trading interdependencies which influenced their perceptions of strategic strength and vulnerability. Yet, at this point, few political scientists have engaged in that debate on the strategic implications of globalization both before 1914 and today. The goal of this paper is to do precisely that.
Why, and how, does the greater interconnectedness of the international system shaped military strategy in two different periods, before 1914 and today? Some strategists acknowledged that this greater interconnectedness led to a decline of the utility of force. Others, however, saw new, unsettling, opportunities for using force. Why does globalization constrain military strategists in some cases, and enable them in others?
I argue that the impact of globalization on strategy is likely to depend on strategists perceptions of globalization and on their conception of the military profession. Borrowing from the resource dependency approach in organization theory, I show that strategists can adapt to globalization in four different ways: (1) strategists can accommodate the demands of globalization on the military’s core competency, and redefine the armed forces’ roles and missions; (2) strategists can refuse to accommodate, and attempt to shape globalization instead; (3) strategists can define a new desired equilibrium between military power’s imperative and globalization; (4), or strategists can allow the existing balance to prevail.
The goal of the paper is to identify and compare the varied responses of land and naval power leading strategists to the increasing demands of globalization on military power in two different eras. I ask if, and to what extent, they thought in terms of the potential impact of globalization when they planned for the employment of military power. Were strategists in both eras aware of globalization dynamics, and did they worry similarly or differently about their consequences on strategy? Were they intellectually well-equipped to integrate economic and technological challenges to military planning? Did they define and conceptualize globalization in similar or different ways during both periods? How did they take it into account when they design military doctrine?
By engaging with the renewal of the historiography of the pre-1914 international system, I hope to contribute to a stimulating interdisciplinary debate at the intersection of history and international politics. |
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| Document Type: |
PDF |
| Page count: |
27 |
| Word count: |
14093 |
| Text sample: |
| P. Vennesson Imagining War in a Globalizing World APSA 2007 - Do not cite or quote 1 IMAGINING WAR IN A GLOBALIZING WORLD: THE POLITICS OF MILITARY ADAPTATION BEFORE 1914 Pascal Vennesson Professor of Political Science European University Institute – Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies Via delle Fontanelle 19 50014 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI) – ITALY Ph. + 39 055 4685 740 / 751 Fax. + 39 055 4685 770 E-Mail: pascal.vennesson@eui.eu -- Do not cite or |
| 35-62. 98 . On the China-Taiwan security situation: Michael O’Hanlon “Why China Cannot Conquer Taiwan” International Security 25 (2) (Fall 2000) 51-86; Thomas J. Christensen “Posing Problems without Catching Up: China’s Rise and Challenges for U.S. Security Policy” International Security 25 (4) (Spring 2001) 5-40; Robert S. Ross “Navigating the Taiwan Strait: Deterrence Escalation Dominance and U.S.-China Relations” International Security 27 (2) (Fall 2002) ; Michael A. Glosny “Strangulation from the Sea? A PRC Submarine Blockade of Taiwan” International |
Similar Titles:
Global Trading System & Geopolitics: How Military Technology Affects International Exchanges and Economic Development
Military Power in a Globalizing International System: The Politics of Military Adaptation
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