Author's Keywords: legislative-executive relations, presidency, latin america	Convention Convention is an application service for managing large or small academic conferences, annual meetings, and other types of events! Submission - Custom fields, multiple submission types, tracks, audio visual, multiple upload formats, automatic conversion to pdf. Review - Peer Review, Bulk reviewer assignment, bulk emails, ranking, z-score statistics, and multiple worksheets! Reports - Many standard and custom reports generated while you wait. Print programs with participant indexes, event grids, and more! Scheduling - Flexible and convenient grid scheduling within rooms and buildings. Conflict checking and advanced filtering. Communication - Bulk email tools to help your administrators send reminders and responses. Use form letters, a message center, and much more! Management - Search tools, duplicate people management, editing tools, submission transfers, many tools to manage a variety of conference management headaches! Click here for more information.
Association: Name: American Political Science Association URL: http://www.apsanet.org
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Zucco, Cesar. "A Formal Model of Presidential-Legislative Relations in Multiparty Settings" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Hyatt Regency Chicago and the Sheraton Chicago Hotel and Towers, Chicago, IL, Aug 30, 2007 <Not Available>. 2011-06-08 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p210310_index.html>

Zucco, C. , 2007-08-30 "A Formal Model of Presidential-Legislative Relations in Multiparty Settings" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Hyatt Regency Chicago and the Sheraton Chicago Hotel and Towers, Chicago, IL Online <APPLICATION/PDF>. 2011-06-08 from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p210310_index.html

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript Abstract: In this paper I address the problem of how presidents obtain legislative support in a presidential multiparty setting. In these settings, presidents exert considerable control over a vast array of politicly useful resources, part of which are used to obtain legislative support in the legislature to govern (pass legislation). I present a formal model of executive-legislative relations that assumes presidents seek to minimize the costs of coalition-formation. In this setup, legislators have an ex ante affinity toward the president, the president controls different types of goods that can be transferred to individual politicians and parties, and this the distribution of resources wins over the votes needed to pass legislation. The model shows that presidents negotiate deals with individual legislators in exchange for legislative support even if economies of scale exist in bargaining with parties as a whole. While exchanging resources for support with individual legislators makes sense both from the president's and from the legislator's perspective, it generates the side-effect of reducing the amount of resources that are channeled to (or through) parties. Thus, the main consequence of institutions that allow for political exchanges between an executive and an individual legislator is the weakening of parties. I briefly discuss Brazil and Uruguay - cases that support this finding. I also carry out the empirical analysis of the model's specific predictions, to test how well the model predicts what actually occurred between 1996 and 2006 in terms of cabinet formation, the distribution of pork, and party behavior in Brazil. Results show that whenever presidents deviate from the model's predictions for optimal behavior, their levels of legislative support dwindle. While based on data from Brazil, these results should generalize to any multiparty presidential system in which the president controls very substantial amounts of non-policy resources, such as in most of Latin America and other new democracies.

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