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Association: Name: American Political Science Association URL: http://www.apsanet.org
Citation: URL: http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p210484_index.html Direct Link: HTML Code:

Walker, Stephen. "Game Theory and Appeasement Models: The Quarrel Between Chamberlain and Eden over Britain's Appeasement Strategy" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Hyatt Regency Chicago and the Sheraton Chicago Hotel and Towers, Chicago, IL, Aug 30, 2007 <Not Available>. 2011-06-08 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p210484_index.html>

Walker, S. G. , 2007-08-30 "Game Theory and Appeasement Models: The Quarrel Between Chamberlain and Eden over Britain's Appeasement Strategy" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Hyatt Regency Chicago and the Sheraton Chicago Hotel and Towers, Chicago, IL Online <PDF>. 2011-06-08 from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p210484_index.html

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript Abstract: Appeasement is a controversial strategy of conflict management and resolution in world politics. Its reputation is sullied by dramatic foreign policy failures ending in war or defeat in which the appeasing state suffers diplomatic and military losses by making costly concessions to other states. Britain�s appeasement policies toward Germany and Italy in the 1930s are perhaps the most notorious examples of the patterns of failure associated with this strategy. Is its reputation deserved or is this strategy of conflict simply misunderstood? How does the appeasement strategy compare with the strategies of bandwagoning, balancing, and domination associated with realist international relations theory? Are there scope conditions under which it is a successful strategy and perhaps even superior to other strategies of conflict management and resolution? Game theory offers a way to investigate these questions by modeling games in which the different strategies of appeasement, bandwagoning, balancing, and domination interact. The equilibria for these games of strategic interaction suggest the likely successes and failures of each strategy against the others. They also offer criteria for assessing the significance of the quarrel between Prime Minister Chamberlain and Foreign Secretary Eden over the British strategy of appeasement toward Italy and Germany in the 1930s.

British Learning Patterns toward Nazi Germany: Why Did Britain Persist with an Appeasement Strategy in the Face of Negative Feedback?

Balance of Power and Components of Power: Britain’s Grand Strategy During the 1930s