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Selection Effects and the War in Vietnam |
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Abstract:
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Proponents of the selection effects approach to democracy and victory argue that because democratic leaders run a higher risk of losing office than autocratic leaders if they suffer defeat in war, they are more careful than their authoritarian counterparts in choosing which wars to enter or initiate. The robust marketplace of ideas in democracies also weeds out self-serving or ill-conceived policies and allows democratic leaders to better estimate the chances of victory. Democracies, according to this logic, tend to pick on weak or vulnerable opponents and thus win a disproportionate number of the wars they start. This selection effects mechanism, however, has not been subjected to close examination in actual cases; proponents of the theory to this point have used statistical methods to establish a correlation between democracy, war initiation, and victory, and inferred rather than observed that selection effects are the reason for democratic success. This paper endeavors to open up the black box between regime type and war outcomes and scrutinize this causal mechanism in detail. It does so by examining a seeming anomaly for the selection effects view: the American decision to initiate war against North Vietnam in 1964-65. In this case, the United States started a war in Southeast Asia that—depending on one’s interpretation—it went on to draw or lose, a costly failure that caused President Lyndon Johnson the Oval Office. Moreover, top officials in the Johnson administration knew at the time the decision was made to escalate that the odds of success in Vietnam were poor, yet they chose to fight anyway. Why would a democratic leader initiate a war he did not expect to win quickly and handily? What are the implications of this case for the selection effects mechanism for democratic victory? |
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war (255), vietnam (144), democraci (116), effect (106), militari (85), democrat (85), south (83), leader (70), u.s (69), reiter (67), would (67), stam (66), select (65), initi (59), state (56), polit (55), north (52), argument (51), win (50), fight (50), govern (49), |
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Association:
Name: American Political Science Association
URL: http://www.apsanet.org
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Citation:
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MLA Citation:
| Downes, Alexander. "Selection Effects and the War in Vietnam" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Hyatt Regency Chicago and the Sheraton Chicago Hotel and Towers, Chicago, IL, Aug 30, 2007 <Not Available>. 2011-06-08 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p211216_index.html> |
APA Citation:
| Downes, A. B. , 2007-08-30 "Selection Effects and the War in Vietnam" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Hyatt Regency Chicago and the Sheraton Chicago Hotel and Towers, Chicago, IL Online <PDF>. 2011-06-08 from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p211216_index.html |
Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: Proponents of the selection effects approach to democracy and victory argue that because democratic leaders run a higher risk of losing office than autocratic leaders if they suffer defeat in war, they are more careful than their authoritarian counterparts in choosing which wars to enter or initiate. The robust marketplace of ideas in democracies also weeds out self-serving or ill-conceived policies and allows democratic leaders to better estimate the chances of victory. Democracies, according to this logic, tend to pick on weak or vulnerable opponents and thus win a disproportionate number of the wars they start. This selection effects mechanism, however, has not been subjected to close examination in actual cases; proponents of the theory to this point have used statistical methods to establish a correlation between democracy, war initiation, and victory, and inferred rather than observed that selection effects are the reason for democratic success. This paper endeavors to open up the black box between regime type and war outcomes and scrutinize this causal mechanism in detail. It does so by examining a seeming anomaly for the selection effects view: the American decision to initiate war against North Vietnam in 1964-65. In this case, the United States started a war in Southeast Asia that—depending on one’s interpretation—it went on to draw or lose, a costly failure that caused President Lyndon Johnson the Oval Office. Moreover, top officials in the Johnson administration knew at the time the decision was made to escalate that the odds of success in Vietnam were poor, yet they chose to fight anyway. Why would a democratic leader initiate a war he did not expect to win quickly and handily? What are the implications of this case for the selection effects mechanism for democratic victory? |
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| Document Type: |
PDF |
| Page count: |
38 |
| Word count: |
22263 |
| Text sample: |
| SELECTION EFFECTS AND THE WAR IN VIETNAM Alexander B. Downes Assistant Professor Department of Political Science Duke University 301A Perkins Library Durham NC 27708 downes@duke.edu AY 2007/08: Research Fellow Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs John F. Kennedy School of Government Harvard University 79 John F. Kennedy St. Cambridge MA 02138 alexander_downes@ksg.harvard.edu Proponents of the selection effects approach to democracy and victory argue that because democratic leaders run a higher risk of losing office than autocratic leaders if |
| and conservative Democrats would join forces to ruin his chances of achieving the Great Society.130 This is by no means the only or perhaps even the most important reason Johnson chose war over withdrawal—concerns about falling dominoes and American credibility loom large as do misplaced analogies to previous events and even Johnson’s fear of humiliation and belief that retreat was cowardly—but it is suggestive that the democratic process in this case if anything gave the president incentives to undertake |
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