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Association: Name: American Political Science Association URL: http://www.apsanet.org
Citation: URL: http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p211389_index.html Direct Link: HTML Code:

Gundlupet, Vaidya. "Facade of Mutual Restraint: Arms Control between Equal Powers" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Hyatt Regency Chicago and the Sheraton Chicago Hotel and Towers, Chicago, IL, Aug 30, 2007 <Not Available>. 2011-06-09 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p211389_index.html>

Gundlupet, V. , 2007-08-30 "Facade of Mutual Restraint: Arms Control between Equal Powers" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Hyatt Regency Chicago and the Sheraton Chicago Hotel and Towers, Chicago, IL Online <PDF>. 2011-06-09 from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p211389_index.html

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript Abstract: This paper inquires into possibilities and limitations of arms control agreements between equal powers. The arms control literature argues that equal states can negotiate arms control agreements to mutually restrain themselves and increase security of both parties at the same time. Differentiating between confidence building measures and constraining arms control agreements, this paper argues that without offense-defense distinguishability, state parties are unwilling to undertake constraining arms control obligations. Strong arms control agreements between equal powers are unlikely to be built because the circumstances in which both states can simultaneously increase their security through cooperation are limited to building confidence-building measures. Further, this paper contends that most of the arguments for arms control are derived from and applicable to conditions contributing to building confidence-building measures, and are wrongly applied to claim that they can support constraining agreements between states. While arms control measures can be useful in avoiding purely accidental wars they cannot lead to stronger agreements restraining actors’ behavior. I also critique two other arguments for arms control: that it is useful to maintain balance of power and can act as a signaling mechanism mitigating the severity of security dilemma. The discussion is complemented by an analysis of the evolution and working of the ABM Treaty, claimed to be one of the ‘strongest’ arms control agreement negotiated by Great Powers to regulate each other. I posit that the Treaty was weak because at that time neither party to the Treaty – the United States and Soviet Union – had the technology to deploy missile defense (and thus did not ‘constrain’ them), and to the extent that they wanted to continue their research into missile defense, both states violated provisions of the Treaty.

Patterns of International Cooperation and the Explanatory Power of Relative Gains: A Game-theoretical Analysis of Cooperation on Global Warming, Ozone Depletion and International trade.

Patterns of International Cooperation and the Explanatory Power of Relative Gains: A Game-theoretical Analysis of Cooperation on Global Warming, Ozone Depletion and International Trade