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A Governing Theory of Legislative Organization |
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Abstract:
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We propose a theory of legislative organization that centers on the governing responsibilities of legislatures. Many legislative issues are non-discretionary in the sense that considerations besides the pre-existing policy priorities of the lawmakers or parties motivate action. For example, it is easy to predict that Congress would take up children’s health insurance this term because the law authorizing the SCHIP program is due to expire. Governing obligations of this kind consume valuable agenda space, giving electorally motivated lawmakers reasons to support structures and routines intended to increase overall legislative productivity. Committees exist to advance this collective goal. We begin by developing a theory that explains how committees are able to overcome the attendant collective action problems first articulated by Mayhew (1974). We then derive predictions concerning who sets the floor agenda, and test them against the predictions of leading partisan and informational theories. |
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committe (146), bill (123), legisl (113), issu (111), parti (91), agenda (77), polici (74), govern (60), member (56), major (56), congress (56), theori (37), organ (37), pass (35), lawmak (33), import (33), success (32), legislatur (32), hous (31), propos (31), incumb (28), |
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congress, legislative organization, congressional committees, bill success |
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Association:
Name: American Political Science Association URL: http://www.apsanet.org
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Citation:
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MLA Citation:
| Adler, Scott. and Wilkerson, John. "A Governing Theory of Legislative Organization" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Hyatt Regency Chicago and the Sheraton Chicago Hotel and Towers, Chicago, IL, Aug 30, 2007 <Not Available>. 2011-06-09 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p212069_index.html> |
APA Citation:
| Adler, S. and Wilkerson, J. D. , 2007-08-30 "A Governing Theory of Legislative Organization" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Hyatt Regency Chicago and the Sheraton Chicago Hotel and Towers, Chicago, IL Online <APPLICATION/PDF>. 2011-06-09 from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p212069_index.html |
Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript Abstract: We propose a theory of legislative organization that centers on the governing responsibilities of legislatures. Many legislative issues are non-discretionary in the sense that considerations besides the pre-existing policy priorities of the lawmakers or parties motivate action. For example, it is easy to predict that Congress would take up children’s health insurance this term because the law authorizing the SCHIP program is due to expire. Governing obligations of this kind consume valuable agenda space, giving electorally motivated lawmakers reasons to support structures and routines intended to increase overall legislative productivity. Committees exist to advance this collective goal. We begin by developing a theory that explains how committees are able to overcome the attendant collective action problems first articulated by Mayhew (1974). We then derive predictions concerning who sets the floor agenda, and test them against the predictions of leading partisan and informational theories. |
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| Document Type: |
application/pdf |
| Page count: |
29 |
| Word count: |
9683 |
| Text sample: |
| A Governing Theory of Legislative Organization E. Scott Adler University of Colorado esadler@colorado.edu John Wilkerson University of Washington jwilker@u.washington.edu Abstract We propose a theory of legislative organization that centers on the governing responsibilities of legislatures. Many legislative issues are non-discretionary in the sense that considerations besides the pre-existing policy priorities of the lawmakers or parties motivate action. For example it is easy to predict that Congress would take up children’s health insurance this term because the law authorizing the |
| (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) Constant -1.532*** -1.755* -1.273 (0.610) (0.236) (1.396) N 530 3731 389 Log pseudo-likelihood -228.891 -704.763 -74.638 Pseudo R2 0.337 0.220 .612 Cell entries are probit coefficients and robust standard errors. Fixed effects for committee of referral not shown. * p <.10 ** p <.05 *** p <.01 28 |
Similar Titles:
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