the courts. They also have personal excesses that manifest in addictions
and hubris as found in any elite group that takes on economic war with
limited training or that lack peer examples in how to handle victories and
the resulting economic rewards. This lack of prudence in engaging in
an ostentatious demonstration of their wealth severely harms their public
image, often overshadowing the public good that they accomplish.
With their motivation to take on the case being primarily economic,
these lawyers intuitively apply an understanding of the relationship between
private policy
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and the strengths and weaknesses of the private economy.
These cause lawyers, as described in the Inner Circle and those recruited
to litigate Florida’s tobacco war, are clearly closer to the economically
motivated cause lawyer range of the spectrum. In any culture in which an
economic and political alliance drives the rewards, a strong legal and ethical
position must be staked out early so that it will not be lost when the struggles
for control and wealth inevitably arise. Loyalty, personal judgment, and
integrity assist in staking out such a position. As a more cause-focused
cause lawyer, I formulated my skills and judgment in public service and
election campaigns. By remaining independent from the “posse” with my
own ethical and legal obligations to the client – the Governor and State
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Private policy is made the by business and financial elites through private decisions termed
“boardroom politics” of those acting in their self-interest in the “free market” collective conduct
super-structure. The free market “is a system that relies on voluntary exchanges between
autonomous individuals to allocate goods and services in an efficient manner.” Carl E. Van
Horn, et al., Politics and Public Policy, Third Edition (Washington D.C.: CQ Press, 2001, 28–
29). Efficiency is “getting the most output for a given input.” Debra Stone, Policy Paradox, 37.
These private decisions based on efficiency in the free market affect the wages, hours, working
conditions, and health of millions of people and allocate vast resources, with little or no
accountability. Carl E. Van Horn, et al., Politics and Public Policy.
of Florida, I am clearly shoring up my power base and legal, and ethical
structure for the impending maelstrom.
There is an understanding of the political impact that the “greedy trial
lawyer” narrative frame being used by corporate interests has on the media
and legislators being lobbied to vote for repeal of the tobacco liability law.
Fred Levin and W.D. take institutional and cause lawyer structural action
to minimize this narrative attack and political fallout. Doing so also has the
added benefit of reducing Fred Levin’s capital and legal time exposure to
zero while ensuring a good financial return if the cause prevails.
Control and spin are not only macro issues as found in metanarratives,
strategic ideological initiatives, and distribution of wealth; they are also
found in micro issues, such as which cause lawyer – more economic focused
or more cause focused – is controlling the instrumental interface between
the institutions of media, legislature, and the courts. There is an internal
struggle for control and power over the instrumental direction. This is
important to both the economic and ideologically motivated actors.
For those motivated by economics, if the cause is economically successful,
instrumental control translates into wealth and increased fees through
credit for work. The media can also advance the notoriety of lawyers, which
can again translate into reputation, clients, and ultimately wealth. For those
with ideological motivations, instrumental control ensures that the embedded
narrative frame is consistent with the more missionary ideological goal
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Convention