All Academic, Inc. Research Logo

Info/CitationFAQResearchAll Academic Inc.
Document

Captured Records - Lessons from the Civil War Through World War II
Unformatted Document Text:  Captured Records – Kevin M. Woods 11  information out of the press and away from political rivals, than his concern over the qual‐ity of scholarship. 34    In  1908,  after  several  years  of  additional  effort,  the  Bureau  of  the  Insular  Affairs  commissioned an academic review of Taylor’s work. The reviewer  reported that Taylor’s  work “lacked the broad and liberal viewpoint and the dispassionate and non‐controversial tone necessary in such a publication.” He further recommended that the work not be pub‐lished without “a complete revision of the work as a whole.” 35  Limited work on the project  continued. However, when Taft became President in 1909, Taylor’s five‐volume collection of adversary documents disappeared into a dark corner of the Bureau’s archives, and has  yet to receive official publication. Historian John Gates summed up one of the primary les‐sons of Taylor’s failed effort:  [As]  Captain  Taylor  discovered,  the  official  historian  is  not  only  bound  by what he believes to be the truth, but also by what his governmental sponsors  are  willing  to  publish.  At  times,  the  writing  of  official  history  becomes  a highly political endeavor, whether the authors want it to be or not, and de‐ spite the scholarly nature of LeRoy’s critique, the decision not to publish Tay‐lor’s compilation was based on political rather than historical criteria. 36    In  1958,  after  many  years  of  negotiation,  the  United  States  returned  the  original  documents to the Philippines. A microfilm copy was created and remains on file in the U.S.  National Archives. In 1971, almost 70 years after the project began, a private foundation in the Philippines finally published Taylor’s work. In the final analysis, the potential damage  to political careers that have resulted from publishing Taylor’s work in the first decade of the  twentieth  century  is  impossible  to  calculate.  It  is  similarly  impossible  to  know  how  much knowledge derived from the study of an insurgency adversary might have improved subsequent U.S. counterinsurgency operations, but it would be hard to argue such knowl‐edge was not relevant. 37                                                             34 In 1902, Theodore Roosevelt and William H. Taft published a book consisting of two extended essays (“The First Civil Governor” by Roosevelt and “Civil Government in the Philippines” by Taft). See Theodore Roose-velt and William Howard Taft, The Philippines, (The Outlook Company, New York, NY: 1902). There are sev-eral reasons why Taylor’s work might have made the administration uncomfortable, including the fact that Tay-lor’s work might challenge aspects of the preferred Roosevelt–Taft narrative, and might have disclosed evidence or accusations of atrocities committed by the United States. and its allies, or evidence of direct communications between revolutionary groups in the Philippines and the U.S. anti-imperialist political movement. For a discus-sion of some of the issues, see John Gates, “Philippine Guerrillas, American Anti-Imperialists, and the Election of 1900,” The Pacific Historical Review, Vol. 46, No. 1, (February 1977), pp. 51–64. 35 John M. Gates, “The Official Historian and the Well-Placed Critic: James A. LeRoy’s Assessment of John R. M. Taylor’s “‘The Philippine Insurrection against the United States,’” The Public Historian, Vol. 7, No. 3, (Summer 1985), p. 60. 36 Gates, “The Official Historian,” p. 66. 37 In 1961, U.S. State Department official Roger Hilsman, decried the Army “traditionalist” reaction to emerging counterinsurgency doctrine, saying that it was “ironic that we Americans have to learn this lesson again in the (Continued) DRAFT WORKING PAPER DRAFT WORKING PAPER

Authors: Woods, Kevin.
first   previous   Page 11 of 30   next   last



background image
Captured Records – Kevin M. Woods
11 
information out of the press and away from political rivals, than his concern over the qual‐
ity of scholarship.
34
  
In  1908,  after  several  years  of  additional  effort,  the  Bureau  of  the  Insular  Affairs 
commissioned an academic review of Taylor’s work. The reviewer  reported that Taylor’s 
work “lacked the broad and liberal viewpoint and the dispassionate and non‐controversial 
tone necessary in such a publication.” He further recommended that the work not be pub‐
lished without “a complete revision of the work as a whole.”
35
 Limited work on the project 
continued. However, when Taft became President in 1909, Taylor’s five‐volume collection 
of adversary documents disappeared into a dark corner of the Bureau’s archives, and has 
yet to receive official publication. Historian John Gates summed up one of the primary les‐
sons of Taylor’s failed effort: 
[As]  Captain  Taylor  discovered,  the  official  historian  is  not  only  bound  by 
what he believes to be the truth, but also by what his governmental sponsors 
are  willing  to  publish.  At  times,  the  writing  of  official  history  becomes  a 
highly political endeavor, whether the authors want it to be or not, and de‐
spite the scholarly nature of LeRoy’s critique, the decision not to publish Tay‐
lor’s compilation was based on political rather than historical criteria.
36
 
 In  1958,  after  many  years  of  negotiation,  the  United  States  returned  the  original 
documents to the Philippines. A microfilm copy was created and remains on file in the U.S. 
National Archives. In 1971, almost 70 years after the project began, a private foundation in 
the Philippines finally published Taylor’s work. In the final analysis, the potential damage 
to political careers that have resulted from publishing Taylor’s work in the first decade of 
the  twentieth  century  is  impossible  to  calculate.  It  is  similarly  impossible  to  know  how 
much knowledge derived from the study of an insurgency adversary might have improved 
subsequent U.S. counterinsurgency operations, but it would be hard to argue such knowl‐
edge was not relevant.
37
  
                                                        
34
In 1902, Theodore Roosevelt and William H. Taft published a book consisting of two extended essays (“The
First Civil Governor” by Roosevelt and “Civil Government in the Philippines” by Taft). See Theodore Roose-
velt and William Howard Taft, The Philippines, (The Outlook Company, New York, NY: 1902). There are sev-
eral reasons why Taylor’s work might have made the administration uncomfortable, including the fact that Tay-
lor’s work might challenge aspects of the preferred Roosevelt–Taft narrative, and might have disclosed evidence
or accusations of atrocities committed by the United States. and its allies, or evidence of direct communications
between revolutionary groups in the Philippines and the U.S. anti-imperialist political movement. For a discus-
sion of some of the issues, see John Gates, “Philippine Guerrillas, American Anti-Imperialists, and the Election
of 1900,” The Pacific Historical Review, Vol. 46, No. 1, (February 1977), pp. 51–64.
35
John M. Gates, “The Official Historian and the Well-Placed Critic: James A. LeRoy’s Assessment of John R. M.
Taylor’s “‘The Philippine Insurrection against the United States,’” The Public Historian, Vol. 7, No. 3, (Summer
1985), p. 60.
36
Gates, “The Official Historian,” p. 66.
37
In 1961, U.S. State Department official Roger Hilsman, decried the Army “traditionalist” reaction to emerging
counterinsurgency doctrine, saying that it was “ironic that we Americans have to learn this lesson again in the
(Continued)
DRAFT WORKING PAPER
DRAFT WORKING PAPER


Convention
Need a solution for abstract management? All Academic can help! Contact us today to find out how our system can help your annual meeting.
Submission - Custom fields, multiple submission types, tracks, audio visual, multiple upload formats, automatic conversion to pdf.
Review - Peer Review, Bulk reviewer assignment, bulk emails, ranking, z-score statistics, and multiple worksheets!
Reports - Many standard and custom reports generated while you wait. Print programs with participant indexes, event grids, and more!
Scheduling - Flexible and convenient grid scheduling within rooms and buildings. Conflict checking and advanced filtering.
Communication - Bulk email tools to help your administrators send reminders and responses. Use form letters, a message center, and much more!
Management - Search tools, duplicate people management, editing tools, submission transfers, many tools to manage a variety of conference management headaches!
Click here for more information.

first   previous   Page 11 of 30   next   last

©2012 All Academic, Inc.