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Campaign Finance Disclosure and Legislative Fundraising Behavior
Unformatted Document Text:  10 positions, as well as media reports and organizational press releases. We define this disclosure of the timing of campaign contributions and votes on proposed policies relevant to groups making those campaign contributions as enhanced disclosure. MAPLight’s data are complete for the 2004 election cycle for California and federal legislators, but unfortunately completion of data collection for the 2006 election cycle was delayed, making it impossible to compare the behavior of legislators before and after the institution of enhanced disclosure. However, we provide the model we will use to test legislative and constituent behavior before and after enhanced disclosure below. Our fourth hypothesis is that enhanced disclosure will make legislators more circumspect, discouraging fundraising around the time of key votes. For the purposes of this study, we operationalize circumspection as the number of days between the contribution from an affected interest group and the vote on a bill that would affect its interests. We anticipate that after the creation of enhanced disclosure, in the 2006 election cycle, that the time between contributions and votes will increase, and so our dependent variable will be the number of days between each contribution-vote pair, and out method of analysis will be multivariate regression. We classify our independent variables in three categories: (1) how badly a legislator needs campaign money; (2) the expectation of publicity; and (3) whether the vote was consistent with the interest group’s position. To measure each legislator’s need for campaign money, we use (a) the total amount raised in the prior election cycle, (b) the vote share in the prior election, (c) the political party (as a control) and (d) whether the legislator held an officer position. All these data are available from the California Secretary of State and the Federal Election Commission. To measure the expectation of publicity, we will use (e) whether the vote was in committee or on the floor; (f) whether the contribution-vote pair was before or after the institution of enhanced disclosure (data for both these variables are gathered by MAPLight), and (g) whether previous contributions and votes were reported in the news media, based on data we gathered by searching for the name of each legislator holding office in

Authors: Apollonio, Dorie. and La Raja, Raymond.
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positions, as well as media reports and organizational press releases. We define this disclosure of the
timing of campaign contributions and votes on proposed policies relevant to groups making those
campaign contributions as enhanced disclosure. MAPLight’s data are complete for the 2004 election
cycle for California and federal legislators, but unfortunately completion of data collection for the
2006 election cycle was delayed, making it impossible to compare the behavior of legislators before
and after the institution of enhanced disclosure. However, we provide the model we will use to test
legislative and constituent behavior before and after enhanced disclosure below.
Our fourth hypothesis is that enhanced disclosure will make legislators more circumspect,
discouraging fundraising around the time of key votes. For the purposes of this study, we
operationalize circumspection as the number of days between the contribution from an affected
interest group and the vote on a bill that would affect its interests. We anticipate that after the
creation of enhanced disclosure, in the 2006 election cycle, that the time between contributions and
votes will increase, and so our dependent variable will be the number of days between each
contribution-vote pair, and out method of analysis will be multivariate regression. We classify our
independent variables in three categories: (1) how badly a legislator needs campaign money; (2) the
expectation of publicity; and (3) whether the vote was consistent with the interest group’s position.
To measure each legislator’s need for campaign money, we use (a) the total amount raised in the
prior election cycle, (b) the vote share in the prior election, (c) the political party (as a control) and
(d) whether the legislator held an officer position. All these data are available from the California
Secretary of State and the Federal Election Commission. To measure the expectation of publicity,
we will use (e) whether the vote was in committee or on the floor; (f) whether the contribution-vote
pair was before or after the institution of enhanced disclosure (data for both these variables are
gathered by MAPLight), and (g) whether previous contributions and votes were reported in the
news media, based on data we gathered by searching for the name of each legislator holding office in


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