All Academic, Inc. Research Logo

Info/CitationFAQResearchAll Academic Inc.
Document

Campaign Finance Disclosure and Legislative Fundraising Behavior
Unformatted Document Text:  9 Our review of public opinion relies on the only survey we found of the perceptions of campaign financing in elections, a study specific to California conducted in November 2002 by the Public Policy Institute of California (PPIC), near the recall of the California governor, which contacted 2,000 adult California residents by telephone to ask about electoral issues. Given the timing of this survey, we anticipated that levels of trust in government would be low, and specific questions about trust asked in the survey revealed this was the case (Baldassare et al. 2004). Given the limited existing studies of money and influence, it was difficult to design a question about what campaign contributions should buy contributors, and researchers suspected that an option for “nothing” would receive automatic assent and provide limited information. As a result, the relevant questions asked respondents what they believed campaign contributors should receive in exchange for giving money to legislators: greater access to legislators, greater influence over policy, or something else. Because it required respondents to volunteer an alternative to these two possibilities, this question wording made it much more likely that respondents would accept that contributions should buy either access or influence. The survey also asked which method of financing campaigns respondents viewed most positively; campaign contributions from private donors, public financing, or candidates using their own money. We use these data to test our third hypothesis that the public opposes the exchange of campaign contributions for any political favors. Our hypotheses about the effects of disclosure on legislative and constituent behavior rely on data collected by a nonprofit research organization, MAPLight ( www.maplight.org ), a group that attempts to “illuminate the connection” between money and politics. To achieve this goal, it tracks campaign contributions received by elected officials (provided by the Center for Responsive Politics and the National Institute on Money in State Politics), and combines these data with information on the voting records of legislators (drawn from state records) and the lobbying positions taken by interest groups that made campaign contributions, drawn from state and federal records on lobbying

Authors: Apollonio, Dorie. and La Raja, Raymond.
first   previous   Page 9 of 24   next   last



background image
9
Our review of public opinion relies on the only survey we found of the perceptions of
campaign financing in elections, a study specific to California conducted in November 2002 by the
Public Policy Institute of California (PPIC), near the recall of the California governor, which
contacted 2,000 adult California residents by telephone to ask about electoral issues. Given the
timing of this survey, we anticipated that levels of trust in government would be low, and specific
questions about trust asked in the survey revealed this was the case (Baldassare et al. 2004). Given
the limited existing studies of money and influence, it was difficult to design a question about what
campaign contributions should buy contributors, and researchers suspected that an option for
“nothing” would receive automatic assent and provide limited information. As a result, the relevant
questions asked respondents what they believed campaign contributors should receive in exchange
for giving money to legislators: greater access to legislators, greater influence over policy, or
something else. Because it required respondents to volunteer an alternative to these two possibilities,
this question wording made it much more likely that respondents would accept that contributions
should buy either access or influence. The survey also asked which method of financing campaigns
respondents viewed most positively; campaign contributions from private donors, public financing,
or candidates using their own money. We use these data to test our third hypothesis that the public
opposes the exchange of campaign contributions for any political favors.
Our hypotheses about the effects of disclosure on legislative and constituent behavior rely
on data collected by a nonprofit research organization, MAPLight (
www.maplight.org
), a group that
attempts to “illuminate the connection” between money and politics. To achieve this goal, it tracks
campaign contributions received by elected officials (provided by the Center for Responsive Politics
and the National Institute on Money in State Politics), and combines these data with information on
the voting records of legislators (drawn from state records) and the lobbying positions taken by
interest groups that made campaign contributions, drawn from state and federal records on lobbying


Convention
All Academic Convention is the premier solution for your association's abstract management solutions needs.
Submission - Custom fields, multiple submission types, tracks, audio visual, multiple upload formats, automatic conversion to pdf.
Review - Peer Review, Bulk reviewer assignment, bulk emails, ranking, z-score statistics, and multiple worksheets!
Reports - Many standard and custom reports generated while you wait. Print programs with participant indexes, event grids, and more!
Scheduling - Flexible and convenient grid scheduling within rooms and buildings. Conflict checking and advanced filtering.
Communication - Bulk email tools to help your administrators send reminders and responses. Use form letters, a message center, and much more!
Management - Search tools, duplicate people management, editing tools, submission transfers, many tools to manage a variety of conference management headaches!
Click here for more information.

first   previous   Page 9 of 24   next   last

©2012 All Academic, Inc.