All Academic, Inc. Research Logo

Info/CitationFAQResearchAll Academic Inc.
Document

Deciding to Quit: A Duration Model of Retirement in Congress
Unformatted Document Text:  One of the most extensively studied areas in the political science literature is that of the careers of members of the House of Representatives. Political scientists have always been interested in why members of House make the decisions that they do. The lure of such a powerful body, with so many members, whose actions are so well documented is too much for many political scientists to resist. The literature has covered their actions in their districts (Fenno 1978), their motivations (Mayhew 1974), how their policy preferences change over time (Poole and Rosenthal 1997), how and why they create positions of power among themselves (Cox and McCubbins 1993) and a variety of other questions. One particular area that has drawn quite an interesting literature is Congressional retirement. So much is written and discussed both in the popular press and within political science about the high rates of Congressional reelection, the lengths that members of Congress will go to be reelected and the perks of office. All that being true, sometimes members of Congress do walk away. Rather then run for another office or for reelection they choose to leave the arena of electoral politics altogether. There can be no greater counter-examples to the idea that members of Congress are obsessed with reelection (Mayhew 1974). We are currently experiencing a surge of retirements among members of the House of Representatives, especially Republicans. At least 22 Republicans and 6 Democrats will be retiring at the end of their current term 1 . Also, retirement is the flip side of the widely studied incumbency advantage. Incumbents usually win reelection. There is much written on how, why, how easily and when this happens, but what is clear to the most casual observer is that in any given year 1 Davis, Susan. Wall Street Journal Online. http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2008/03/20/another-house- republican-opts-for-retirement-2/?mod=WSJBlog .

Authors: Sempolinski, Joseph.
first   previous   Page 2 of 32   next   last



background image
One of the most extensively studied areas in the political science literature is that
of the careers of members of the House of Representatives. Political scientists have
always been interested in why members of House make the decisions that they do. The
lure of such a powerful body, with so many members, whose actions are so well
documented is too much for many political scientists to resist. The literature has covered
their actions in their districts (Fenno 1978), their motivations (Mayhew 1974), how their
policy preferences change over time (Poole and Rosenthal 1997), how and why they
create positions of power among themselves (Cox and McCubbins 1993) and a variety of
other questions.
One particular area that has drawn quite an interesting literature is Congressional
retirement. So much is written and discussed both in the popular press and within
political science about the high rates of Congressional reelection, the lengths that
members of Congress will go to be reelected and the perks of office. All that being true,
sometimes members of Congress do walk away. Rather then run for another office or for
reelection they choose to leave the arena of electoral politics altogether. There can be no
greater counter-examples to the idea that members of Congress are obsessed with
reelection (Mayhew 1974). We are currently experiencing a surge of retirements among
members of the House of Representatives, especially Republicans. At least 22
Republicans and 6 Democrats will be retiring at the end of their current term
Also, retirement is the flip side of the widely studied incumbency advantage.
Incumbents usually win reelection. There is much written on how, why, how easily and
when this happens, but what is clear to the most casual observer is that in any given year
1
Davis, Susan. Wall Street Journal Online.


Convention
All Academic Convention makes running your annual conference simple and cost effective. It is your online solution for abstract management, peer review, and scheduling for your annual meeting or convention.
Submission - Custom fields, multiple submission types, tracks, audio visual, multiple upload formats, automatic conversion to pdf.
Review - Peer Review, Bulk reviewer assignment, bulk emails, ranking, z-score statistics, and multiple worksheets!
Reports - Many standard and custom reports generated while you wait. Print programs with participant indexes, event grids, and more!
Scheduling - Flexible and convenient grid scheduling within rooms and buildings. Conflict checking and advanced filtering.
Communication - Bulk email tools to help your administrators send reminders and responses. Use form letters, a message center, and much more!
Management - Search tools, duplicate people management, editing tools, submission transfers, many tools to manage a variety of conference management headaches!
Click here for more information.

first   previous   Page 2 of 32   next   last

©2012 All Academic, Inc.