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A Comparative Analysis of Associations of Governors in Argentina and Mexico
Unformatted Document Text:  5 these transfers constitute almost 90% of their total amount of resources, see Figure 2). On the other hand, the distribution of federal resources has historically resulted from political negotiations rather than from objective and explicit rules, such as levels of poverty or measures of underdevelopment (Tommasi et al. 2001). Given the fact that their legislators may block any attempt to amend the manner in which resources are to be distributed, small and overrepresented provinces have usually been the clear winners of these negotiations (Gibson and Calvo 2000). Subnational governments in Mexico are still far less influential than their counterparts in Argentina, although this is changing rapidly as other studies have revealed (Díaz- Cayeros 2007, Flamand 2007). Note, for example, a) Argentinean provinces collect, on average, approximately 38 percent of the total government income while Mexican states only around 6 percent (see figure 1), and b) although there is variation, federal legislators in Argentina are extremely responsive to provincial interests (especially when they are copartisans of the governor) (Jones et al. 2002, Jones and Hwang 2005) , while Mexican legislators tend to be more in tune with the preferences of their national party leadership (Langston 2003). In Mexico, since the late 1930s, and until very recently, the central government has held both states and municipalities in awe in the fiscal, administrative and political realms. During the hegemony of the PRI, in fact, states operated mostly as delegates of the federal government in their territory, and municipalities as agents of their respective state government. PRIista subnational officials tended to bend to the wishes of their hierarchical superior within the party (either governor or president) in order to further their own political careers and to avoid dismissal from gubernatorial or municipal office (Dominguez 1999; Ward and Rodriguez 1999). In the political arena, governors did not have much influence over the nominations of candidates to the federal congress as deputies or senators, and thus federal legislators tended to respond to partisan rather than regional interests (Diaz Cayeros 2006). In the relationship of state governments with federal bureaucrats, the principle contact was with the state office (delegación) of the respective federal ministry. On important

Authors: Flamand, Laura. and Juan, Olmeda.
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these transfers constitute almost 90% of their total amount of resources, see Figure 2).
On the other hand, the distribution of federal resources has historically resulted from
political negotiations rather than from objective and explicit rules, such as levels of
poverty or measures of underdevelopment (Tommasi et al. 2001). Given the fact that
their legislators may block any attempt to amend the manner in which resources are to
be distributed, small and overrepresented provinces have usually been the clear winners
of these negotiations (Gibson and Calvo 2000).
Subnational governments in Mexico are still far less influential than their counterparts
in Argentina, although this is changing rapidly as other studies have revealed (Díaz-
Cayeros 2007, Flamand 2007). Note, for example, a) Argentinean provinces collect, on
average, approximately 38 percent of the total government income while Mexican states
only around 6 percent (see figure 1), and b) although there is variation, federal legislators
in Argentina are extremely responsive to provincial interests (especially when they are
copartisans of the governor) (Jones et al. 2002, Jones and Hwang 2005) , while Mexican
legislators tend to be more in tune with the preferences of their national party leadership
(Langston 2003).
In Mexico, since the late 1930s, and until very recently, the central government has
held both states and municipalities in awe in the fiscal, administrative and political
realms. During the hegemony of the PRI, in fact, states operated mostly as delegates of
the federal government in their territory, and municipalities as agents of their respective
state government. PRIista subnational officials tended to bend to the wishes of their
hierarchical superior within the party (either governor or president) in order to further
their own political careers and to avoid dismissal from gubernatorial or municipal office
(Dominguez 1999; Ward and Rodriguez 1999).
In the political arena, governors did not have much influence over the nominations of
candidates to the federal congress as deputies or senators, and thus federal legislators
tended to respond to partisan rather than regional interests (Diaz Cayeros 2006). In the
relationship of state governments with federal bureaucrats, the principle contact was
with the state office (delegación) of the respective federal ministry. On important


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