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Cabinet Duration in Latin American Presidential Democracies
Unformatted Document Text:  which cabinets can be sustained are different from country to country. 24 Therefore, the effects of the time until the next mandatory election as a percentage of CIEP (maximum days in office) need to be controlled. A conventional way to control the time effect is censoring. King et al. (1990) set one year prior to the next election for the censoring point; however, there are no plausible reasons for one year prior to next election to be the watershed. Therefore, I use actual days to next election as a percentage of total days in term for control. Finally, after estimating the effects of the independent variables above on cabinet duration, dummy variables for different countries are included in the models to see how much of the information about the duration of cabinets is not explained by the listed variables . If the differences in explanatory power (log-likelihood) between the models with and without the country dummies are large, we can conclude that unknown country-specific factors have considerable effects on cabinet duration. 3. Empirical Results Table 2 summarizes the hazard model estimates of the effects of the independent variables on the duration of cabinets. The null hypothesis is that the coefficient is 1; hence, a coefficient 1.5 means that a one-unit increase in the independent variable raises the hazard of cabinet dissolution by 50%, whereas a coefficient .5 means that one unit increase in the variable halves the hazard. Models 1-2 assess the validity of the attributes theory. First, model 1 tests the arguments of the parliament features theorists. Only the degree of fragmentation in the parliament seems to have the expected effects on cabinet duration. A one-unit increase in the effective number of parliamentary party (ENPS) would increase the risk of cabinet dissolution by 61.2%. The effects 24 In presidentialism the timing of the presidential election and legislative election also affects the CIEP. Some countries, such as Bolivia and Costa Rica, hold both elections at the same time (concurrent election), while others, such as Chile, hold the elections separately (nonconcurrent election). The CIEP of the countries with concurrent elections is generally larger than that with nonconcurrent elections. 17

Authors: Shin, Jae Hyeok.
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which cabinets can be sustained are different from country to country.
Therefore, the effects of
the time until the next mandatory election as a percentage of CIEP (maximum days in office)
need to be controlled. A conventional way to control the time effect is censoring. King et al.
(1990) set one year prior to the next election for the censoring point; however, there are no
plausible reasons for one year prior to next election to be the watershed. Therefore, I use actual
days to next election as a percentage of total days in term for control.
Finally, after estimating the effects of the independent variables above on cabinet
duration, dummy variables for different countries are included in the models to see how much of
the information about the duration of cabinets is not explained by the listed variables . If the
differences in explanatory power (log-likelihood) between the models with and without the
country dummies are large, we can conclude that unknown country-specific factors have
considerable effects on cabinet duration.
3. Empirical Results
Table 2 summarizes the hazard model estimates of the effects of the independent variables on the
duration of cabinets. The null hypothesis is that the coefficient is 1; hence, a coefficient 1.5
means that a one-unit increase in the independent variable raises the hazard of cabinet dissolution
by 50%, whereas a coefficient .5 means that one unit increase in the variable halves the hazard.
Models 1-2 assess the validity of the attributes theory. First, model 1 tests the arguments
of the parliament features theorists. Only the degree of fragmentation in the parliament seems to
have the expected effects on cabinet duration. A one-unit increase in the effective number of
parliamentary party (ENPS) would increase the risk of cabinet dissolution by 61.2%. The effects
24
In presidentialism the timing of the presidential election and legislative election also affects the CIEP. Some
countries, such as Bolivia and Costa Rica, hold both elections at the same time (concurrent election), while others,
such as Chile, hold the elections separately (nonconcurrent election). The CIEP of the countries with concurrent
elections is generally larger than that with nonconcurrent elections.
17


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