All Academic, Inc. Research Logo

Info/CitationFAQResearchAll Academic Inc.
Document

Bargaining Over Power: When Do Rapid Shifts in Power Lead to War?
Unformatted Document Text:  Lemma 5.4. Let Γ ′′ be a game in which capabilities cannot be transferred, but the players can negotiate over the timing of their negotiations i.e., Γ ′′ t = (Γ t {Ω t }) ∪ {Ω ′′ t }, where Ω ′′ t = x t , ∆ t ∈ R 2 : 0 ≤ x t ≤ X and ∆ t > 0 . Then war occurs in equilibrium in stage Γ ′′ t whenever M i t > max σ i V i (σ|c t ) − δM j t . Thus, the problem is for B to find a way to commit not to exploit his stronger power in the next period. B could try convincing A of his intentions, but this is essentially cheap talk and is not credible, as B will have an incentive to renege on his promise in the next period. Therefore, any credible mechanism of commitment must involve changing B ’s incentives tomorrow. Proposition 5.1 ensures that this is always possible: Proposition 5.1. Efficiency: War never occurs in equilibrium in Γ This result is important: it shows that the inefficiency condition derived in Powell (2004) never holds when transfers of capabilities are added as a dimension in the bargaining space. By giving up capabilities now, B changes his expected maximization problem in the next period, and hence credible commits to the agreement in the next period. Most important, the result holds no matter how rapidly power shifts. Note moreover that the result is applicable to any bargaining protocol with an outside option. As a result, fast changes in relative power associated with commitment problems cannot be a sufficient explanation for war. Obviously, B should only give up enough capabilities to keep A satisfied: below this level, B’s future power remains too high and A prefers to fight now. Beyond it, B gives up too much and A will be tempted to fight tomorrow. Proposition 5.1 ensures that there always exists an amount of capabilities c ∗ for B to give up that falls between these two bounds. The precise bounds of c ∗ are a function of the amount of the pie obtained in the current period, and the minimum future power the player is willing to accept. 19 19 Note that the lemma only establishes bounds for the agreement. The specific agreement reached within 11

Authors: Chadefaux, Thomas.
first   previous   Page 13 of 45   next   last



background image
Lemma 5.4.
Let Γ
′′
be a game in which capabilities cannot be transferred, but the players
can negotiate over the timing of their negotiations i.e., Γ
′′
t
= (Γ
t
{Ω
t
}) ∪ {Ω
′′
t
}, where
′′
t
= x
t
,
t
∈ R
2
: 0 ≤ x
t
≤ X and ∆
t
>
0 .
Then war occurs in equilibrium in stage Γ
′′
t
whenever M
i
t
>
max
σ
i
V
i
(σ|c
t
) − δM
j
t
.
Thus, the problem is for B to find a way to commit not to exploit his stronger power
in the next period. B could try convincing A of his intentions, but this is essentially
cheap talk and is not credible, as B will have an incentive to renege on his promise in the
next period. Therefore, any credible mechanism of commitment must involve changing
B
’s incentives tomorrow. Proposition 5.1 ensures that this is always possible:
Proposition 5.1.
Efficiency: War never occurs in equilibrium in Γ
This result is important: it shows that the inefficiency condition derived in Powell
(2004) never holds when transfers of capabilities are added as a dimension in the
bargaining space. By giving up capabilities now, B changes his expected maximization
problem in the next period, and hence credible commits to the agreement in the next
period. Most important, the result holds no matter how rapidly power shifts. Note
moreover that the result is applicable to any bargaining protocol with an outside option.
As a result, fast changes in relative power associated with commitment problems cannot
be a sufficient explanation for war.
Obviously, B should only give up enough capabilities to keep A satisfied: below this
level, B’s future power remains too high and A prefers to fight now. Beyond it, B gives
up too much and A will be tempted to fight tomorrow. Proposition 5.1 ensures that
there always exists an amount of capabilities c
for B to give up that falls between these
two bounds. The precise bounds of c
are a function of the amount of the pie obtained
in the current period, and the minimum future power the player is willing to accept.
19
19
Note that the lemma only establishes bounds for the agreement. The specific agreement reached within
11


Convention
Submission, Review, and Scheduling! All Academic Convention can help with all of your abstract management needs and many more. Contact us today for a quote!
Submission - Custom fields, multiple submission types, tracks, audio visual, multiple upload formats, automatic conversion to pdf.
Review - Peer Review, Bulk reviewer assignment, bulk emails, ranking, z-score statistics, and multiple worksheets!
Reports - Many standard and custom reports generated while you wait. Print programs with participant indexes, event grids, and more!
Scheduling - Flexible and convenient grid scheduling within rooms and buildings. Conflict checking and advanced filtering.
Communication - Bulk email tools to help your administrators send reminders and responses. Use form letters, a message center, and much more!
Management - Search tools, duplicate people management, editing tools, submission transfers, many tools to manage a variety of conference management headaches!
Click here for more information.

first   previous   Page 13 of 45   next   last

©2012 All Academic, Inc.