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Bargaining and Rationalist Explanations for War

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Abstract:

In this study, the pre-war bargaining process is analyzed using a revised Rubinstein bargaining model. The equilibrium analysis provides a consistent account of the decision to go to war in the rationalist framework.

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bargain (255), war (255), state (226), 1 (168), 2 (144), advantag (116), crisi (105), model (84), cost (80), general (69), first (64), militari (61), scenario (59), inform (58), game (56), intrawar (49), round (48), two (48), complet (47), process (46), util (43),
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Name: MPSA Annual National Conference
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http://www.indiana.edu/~mpsa/


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Ye, Min. "Bargaining and Rationalist Explanations for War" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the MPSA Annual National Conference, Palmer House Hotel, Hilton, Chicago, IL, Apr 03, 2008 <Not Available>. 2013-12-14 <http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p267852_index.html>

APA Citation:

Ye, M. , 2008-04-03 "Bargaining and Rationalist Explanations for War" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the MPSA Annual National Conference, Palmer House Hotel, Hilton, Chicago, IL Online <APPLICATION/PDF>. 2013-12-14 from http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p267852_index.html

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: In this study, the pre-war bargaining process is analyzed using a revised Rubinstein bargaining model. The equilibrium analysis provides a consistent account of the decision to go to war in the rationalist framework.

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Associated Document Available MPSA Annual National Conference
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Associated Document Available Political Research Online

Document Type: application/pdf
Page count: 42
Word count: 13323
Text sample:
Bargaining and rationalist explanations for war Min Ye Department of Politics Coastal Carolina University P.O. Box 261954 Conway SC 29528-6054 Email: mye@coastal.edu A Paper Presented at the Annual Meeting of Midwest Political Science Association Chicago 4-2008. ABSTRACT In this study two widely-accepted norms in current bargaining literature are reexamined. First I contend that traditional separation between crisis and intrawar bargaining lacks sound theoretical grounds therefore fails to capture the nature of using force in international politics. Instead I propose
advantage in scenario IV ( p1 − κ 1 < 0 < p 2 − κ 2 and c1 > c2 ). This scenario is similar to scenario I. The outcome is determined by which advantage is dominant. For instance if player 2’s bargaining advantage is dominant ( p2 − κ 2 < 1 − c2 ) for the same reasons in the first scenario the SPE is the same in the pure bargaining. On the other hand if


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