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A Bargaining Model of Domestic Politics and the Cost of War

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Abstract:

The bargaining model of war shows the expected costs of war are influential in shaping both war and demands. We show that expected costs vary with domestic political institutions and costs have different variances depending on domestic institutions.

Most Common Document Word Stems:

model (90), bargain (90), con (75), ict (73), war (64), p (55), propos (51), demand (45), predict (45), probabl (45), equilibrium (37), polit (37), 1 (36), e (32), state (30), ration (28), x2 (26), respond (26), experi (26), inform (25), stage (23),
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Name: MPSA Annual National Conference
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http://www.indiana.edu/~mpsa/


Citation:
URL: http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p267860_index.html
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MLA Citation:

Clark, David., Holt, Charles., Nordstrom, Timothy., Reed, William. and Sieberg, Katri. "A Bargaining Model of Domestic Politics and the Cost of War" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the MPSA Annual National Conference, Palmer House Hotel, Hilton, Chicago, IL, Apr 03, 2008 <Not Available>. 2013-12-14 <http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p267860_index.html>

APA Citation:

Clark, D. H., Holt, C. , Nordstrom, T. , Reed, W. and Sieberg, K. K. , 2008-04-03 "A Bargaining Model of Domestic Politics and the Cost of War" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the MPSA Annual National Conference, Palmer House Hotel, Hilton, Chicago, IL Online <APPLICATION/PDF>. 2013-12-14 from http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p267860_index.html

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: The bargaining model of war shows the expected costs of war are influential in shaping both war and demands. We show that expected costs vary with domestic political institutions and costs have different variances depending on domestic institutions.

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Associated Document Available MPSA Annual National Conference
Associated Document Available All Academic Inc.
Associated Document Available Political Research Online

Document Type: application/pdf
Page count: 25
Word count: 7307
Text sample:
Some Experimental Results for a Bargaining Model of War David Clark Charles Holt Binghamton University University of Virginia Timothy Nordstrom William Reed Katri Sieberg University of Mississippi Rice University University of Tampere March 31 2008 Abstract We provide the first experimental results on a two-stage model of militarized con- flict based on the ubiquitous ultimatum bargaining game that dominates much of the theoretical analysis of international relations. We illustrate how data from experimen- tal trials deviate from the equilibrium
0.10 A vg. Proposer D emand $1.00 $0.00 0.00 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 Proposer Win Probability Proposer Win Probability (a) (b) Figure 2: First Round Data: Observed and Predicted Demands and Conflict Proportions


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