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A Bargaining Model of Domestic Politics and the Cost of War
Unformatted Document Text:  Holt, Charles A. & S.K. Laury. 2002. “Risk Aversion and Incentive Effects.” American Economic Review 92:1644–1655. Lewis, J.B. & K.A. Schultz. 2003. “Revealing Preferences: Empirical Estimation of a Crisis Bargaining Game with Incomplete Information.” Political Analysis 11(4):345–367. McKelvey, Richard D. & Thomas R. Palfrey. 1995. “Quantal Response Equilibria for Normal Form Games.” Games and Economic Behavior 10:6–38. McKelvey, Richard D. & Thomas R. Palfrey. 1998. “Quantal Response Equilibria for Exten- sive Form Games.” Experimental Economics 1(1):9–41. Morrow, James D. 1989. “Capabilities, Uncertainty, and Resolve: A Limited Information Model of Crisis Bargaining.” American Journal of Political Science 33(4):941–72. Morrow, James D. 1991. “Alliances and Asymmetry: An Alternative to the Capability Aggregation Model of Alliances.” American Journal of Political Science 35(4):904–933. Morrow, James D. 1994. “Alliances, Credibility, and Peacetime Costs.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 38(2):270–297. Morton, Rebecca. 1999. Methods and Models: A Guide to the Empirical Analysis of Formal Models in Political Science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Powell, Robert. 1999. In the Shadow of Power: States and Strategies in International Politics. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. Reed, William, David H. Clark, Timothy Nordstrom & Wonjae Hwang. 2006. “Instrumental Territorial Claims.” unpublished manuscript. Reed, William, David H. Clark, Timothy Nordstrom & Wonjae Hwang. 2008. “War, Power, and Bargaining.” Journal of Politics forthcoming. Schelling, Thomas C. 1960. The Strategy of Conflict. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 20

Authors: Clark, David., Holt, Charles., Nordstrom, Timothy., Reed, William. and Sieberg, Katri.
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Holt, Charles A. & S.K. Laury. 2002. “Risk Aversion and Incentive Effects.” American
Economic Review 92:1644–1655.
Lewis, J.B. & K.A. Schultz. 2003. “Revealing Preferences: Empirical Estimation of a Crisis
Bargaining Game with Incomplete Information.” Political Analysis 11(4):345–367.
McKelvey, Richard D. & Thomas R. Palfrey. 1995. “Quantal Response Equilibria for Normal
Form Games.” Games and Economic Behavior 10:6–38.
McKelvey, Richard D. & Thomas R. Palfrey. 1998. “Quantal Response Equilibria for Exten-
sive Form Games.” Experimental Economics 1(1):9–41.
Morrow, James D. 1989. “Capabilities, Uncertainty, and Resolve: A Limited Information
Model of Crisis Bargaining.” American Journal of Political Science 33(4):941–72.
Morrow, James D. 1991. “Alliances and Asymmetry: An Alternative to the Capability
Aggregation Model of Alliances.” American Journal of Political Science 35(4):904–933.
Morrow, James D. 1994. “Alliances, Credibility, and Peacetime Costs.” Journal of Conflict
Resolution 38(2):270–297.
Morton, Rebecca. 1999. Methods and Models: A Guide to the Empirical Analysis of Formal
Models in Political Science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Powell, Robert. 1999. In the Shadow of Power: States and Strategies in International Politics.
Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
Reed, William, David H. Clark, Timothy Nordstrom & Wonjae Hwang. 2006. “Instrumental
Territorial Claims.” unpublished manuscript.
Reed, William, David H. Clark, Timothy Nordstrom & Wonjae Hwang. 2008. “War, Power,
and Bargaining.” Journal of Politics forthcoming.
Schelling, Thomas C. 1960. The Strategy of Conflict. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
20


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