All Academic, Inc. Research Logo

Info/CitationFAQResearchAll Academic Inc.
Document

Hegemonic Competition, Hegemonic Disruption and the Current War
Unformatted Document Text:  Newmann: DRAFT: Please do not cite without permission Somalia. 101 Both Sunni extremist groups, with ties to al-Qaeda, took advantage of chaotic civil war and fought their way to power, the Taliban in 1996 and the UIC in June 2006. Both since have been defeated by opposition forces, but remain a threat to the governments that replaced them. These groups were allies of al-Qaeda and in the case of the Taliban the ties were extensive. Whether al-Qaeda could use a civil war or failed state to develop the more conventional-style political-military organization it would need to capture a nation’s capital in this manner is unclear. It would require al-Qaeda to move from the task of sustaining terrorist operations to building combat capability. Al-Qaeda did maintain a conventional-style combat brigade in Afghanistan, but it has not created anything like that since the overthrow of the Taliban in 2001. 102 Third, al-Qaeda could follow the model of the National Islamic Front in Sudan, which came to power in a coup in 1989. 103 General Bashir came to power as the leader of a Sudanese Army faction. He had established institutional ties throughout the political, economic, and military structure of the nation which allowed him to seize and maintain power. He then moved Sudan further toward Sunni extremism and operational ties with al-Qaeda that lasted until the relationship was deemed more trouble than it was worth. Bin-Laden and al-Qaeda lost their sanctuary in Sudan in 1996, landing on their feet in the Taliban-controlled Afghanistan. This scenario relies on al-Qaeda’s ability to infiltrate established institutions, creating a critical mass of believers in established political circles. The fear of exactly this scenario is what led General Pervez Musharraf in Pakistan to purge his officer corps of suspected extremists after seizing power. 104 CASE STUDIES TO FOLLOW (emphasize the fate of these states and their regimes: pariahs (Itan, Afghan), counterrevolution or invasion (Afghan, Somalia), squeezed out by allies (Sudan) US Revisionist Hegemony: A Complicating Factor 101 On Taliban and UIC 102 On the 055 Brigade 103 On Sudan and NIF 104 On Musharraf’s efforts to stay in power. 37

Authors: Newmann, William.
first   previous   Page 37 of 43   next   last



background image
Newmann: DRAFT: Please do not cite without permission
Somalia.
Both Sunni extremist groups, with ties to al-Qaeda, took advantage of chaotic civil war and
fought their way to power, the Taliban in 1996 and the UIC in June 2006. Both since have been defeated
by opposition forces, but remain a threat to the governments that replaced them. These groups were
allies of al-Qaeda and in the case of the Taliban the ties were extensive. Whether al-Qaeda could use a
civil war or failed state to develop the more conventional-style political-military organization it would
need to capture a nation’s capital in this manner is unclear. It would require al-Qaeda to move from the
task of sustaining terrorist operations to building combat capability. Al-Qaeda did maintain a
conventional-style combat brigade in Afghanistan, but it has not created anything like that since the
overthrow of the Taliban in 2001.
Third, al-Qaeda could follow the model of the National Islamic
Front in Sudan, which came to power in a coup in 1989.
General Bashir came to power as the leader of
a Sudanese Army faction. He had established institutional ties throughout the political, economic, and
military structure of the nation which allowed him to seize and maintain power. He then moved Sudan
further toward Sunni extremism and operational ties with al-Qaeda that lasted until the relationship was
deemed more trouble than it was worth. Bin-Laden and al-Qaeda lost their sanctuary in Sudan in 1996,
landing on their feet in the Taliban-controlled Afghanistan. This scenario relies on al-Qaeda’s ability to
infiltrate established institutions, creating a critical mass of believers in established political circles. The
fear of exactly this scenario is what led General Pervez Musharraf in Pakistan to purge his officer corps of
suspected extremists after seizing power.
CASE STUDIES TO FOLLOW (emphasize the fate of these states and their regimes: pariahs (Itan,
Afghan), counterrevolution or invasion (Afghan, Somalia), squeezed out by allies (Sudan)
US Revisionist Hegemony: A Complicating Factor
101
On Taliban and UIC
102
On the 055 Brigade
103
On Sudan and NIF
104
On Musharraf’s efforts to stay in power.
37


Convention
All Academic Convention is the premier solution for your association's abstract management solutions needs.
Submission - Custom fields, multiple submission types, tracks, audio visual, multiple upload formats, automatic conversion to pdf.
Review - Peer Review, Bulk reviewer assignment, bulk emails, ranking, z-score statistics, and multiple worksheets!
Reports - Many standard and custom reports generated while you wait. Print programs with participant indexes, event grids, and more!
Scheduling - Flexible and convenient grid scheduling within rooms and buildings. Conflict checking and advanced filtering.
Communication - Bulk email tools to help your administrators send reminders and responses. Use form letters, a message center, and much more!
Management - Search tools, duplicate people management, editing tools, submission transfers, many tools to manage a variety of conference management headaches!
Click here for more information.

first   previous   Page 37 of 43   next   last

©2012 All Academic, Inc.