would believe the old security norms to be redundant and would thus seek new power
relations – such as re-renegotiating ties to non-regional powers –which they believe
would guarantee, or go some way to improving, their security. According to the Gulf
States, Tehran would also be expected to become more assertive and belligerent if it were
to acquire a nuclear capability. In the face of an emboldened Iran, Saudi Arabia, along
with other Gulf States, expects to face various types of maneuvers originating either
directly from Iran or from regional proxies, such as Hezbollah.
The Gulf States also have economic concerns related to foreign investments in
the Gulf, which may be adversely affected in the case of military confrontation between
the West and Iran. In such an eventuality, the Gulf States may well believe that the image
of the UAE as an asset to the world economy would depreciate. Moreover, the Emirates
themselves are also concerned about Iran taking advantage of such a precarious situation
and asserting its economic weight in the Gulf.
One of Saudi Arabia’s main concerns, as mentioned above, is avoiding any kind
of confrontation with Iran or one of its proxies in the region, which is why it can be
argued that a nuclear capable Iran could further Riyadh’s intentions of acquiring a
nuclear capability. The primary aim behind such a move by Riyadh would be to counter-
balance Tehran’s influence in the region. The eventuality of such a situation would also
hasten Egypt’s drive to acquire a nuclear capability. According to some observers, Egypt
is lending covert support to Iran’s drive to develop nuclear weapons in order to counter
Israel’s strength in the region whilst at the same time refraining from developing – or is
hindered from developing – a capability of its own due to financial and political factors.
Moreover, it can also be argued that at the moment Cairo does not want to lose its non-
nuclear status within the NPT as this remains the optimum conduit through which
pressure can be applied to Israel; such status would also allow Cairo to make public its
call for a WMD-free zone in the Middle East.
In the non-Arab part of Iran’s neighborhood, some scholars do mention Turkey
as a possible candidate for going nuclear in the face of Iran acquiring a nuclear capability,
though this would only occur if drastic strategic shifts (for instance, the absence of a
US/NATO security quarantine) were to occur in her (Turkey’s) security calculations. It
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Convention