Author's Keywords: Democracy, Political Economy, Reform	Convention All Academic Convention makes running your annual conference simple and cost effective. It is your online solution for abstract management, peer review, and scheduling for your annual meeting or convention. Submission - Custom fields, multiple submission types, tracks, audio visual, multiple upload formats, automatic conversion to pdf. Review - Peer Review, Bulk reviewer assignment, bulk emails, ranking, z-score statistics, and multiple worksheets! Reports - Many standard and custom reports generated while you wait. Print programs with participant indexes, event grids, and more! Scheduling - Flexible and convenient grid scheduling within rooms and buildings. Conflict checking and advanced filtering. Communication - Bulk email tools to help your administrators send reminders and responses. Use form letters, a message center, and much more! Management - Search tools, duplicate people management, editing tools, submission transfers, many tools to manage a variety of conference management headaches! Click here for more information.
Association: Name: BALAS Annual Conference URL: http://http://www.balas.org/
Citation: URL: http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p296836_index.html Direct Link: HTML Code:

Pinto, David. "The Effects of Political Competition on the Feasibility of Economic Reform" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the BALAS Annual Conference, ITESM, Guadalajara, Mexico, Apr 01, 2009 <Not Available>. 2013-05-05 <http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p296836_index.html>

Pinto, D. , 2009-04-01 "The Effects of Political Competition on the Feasibility of Economic Reform" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the BALAS Annual Conference, ITESM, Guadalajara, Mexico Online <APPLICATION/PDF>. 2013-05-05 from http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p296836_index.html

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript Review Method: Peer Reviewed Abstract: In contrast to standard models of reform which focus on economic rent preservation and informational asymmetries, this paper links political competition to feasibility of reform: In democratic regimes, successful implementation of reform generates asymmetric electoral gains, as voters reward the party associated with reform. This generates a tradeoff for competitors between supporting reform for the welfare benefits and blocking reform to prevent electoral losses. This paper presents a rational model to explain the slowdown of economic liberalization in Post-Soviet and Latin American countries such as Mexico, following the strong wave of political and economic liberalization of the 1990’s.

The Electoral Impact of Partisan Economic Policy: Auditing the Pocketbooks of Self-Interested Voters

Electoral Reform After the Election of 2000: A Study of the Impact of Politics on Policy Decisions and How Those Decisions Impact the Responsiveness of the Electoral System