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The Impact of Chilean Publicly Traded Firms’ Ownership Structures
On Performance and Disclosure Levels
INTRODUCTION
Lins (2003) investigates the implications of different ownership structures for firm
valuations and corporate governance in emerging markets. She finds that in emerging markets,
outside block stockholders such as institutional investors play an important role in restraining
managerial agency costs by acting as a substitute for missing governance mechanisms. In
emerging markets, publicly traded firms are related in one way or another to economic groups that
closely control them by holding a large portion of their shares. In such instances, agency problems
between controlling and minority shareholders are developed (Lefort and Walker, 2007; Khanna
and Palepu, 1999). This study contributes to the growing literature on corporate governance by
analyzing recent developments in the ownership structures of publicly traded firms in Chile, one
of the most important emerging markets in Latin America. Specifically, the study measures the
impact of institutional holdings and insiders’ ownership on firm performance and disclosure
levels. In Chile, institutional ownership levels have increased substantially as a result of the
privatization of the social security system.
The study of corporate governance developments in Chile provides a unique case to
understand whether the efforts of emerging markets to improve transparency are working. In
particular, in the last two decades Chile has introduced new legislations and market-based
mechanisms to improve corporate governance. Since 1980, Chile has attempted to improve the
participation of outside block shareholders by privatizing its social security system, and creating
new regulated institutions. The Chilean legal system follows the tradition of French civil law, but
the securities laws and corporate laws were reformed in 1994 and 2000 to be more closely aligned
with laws in the United States. The Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development