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Latin American Board of Directors and Expropriation of Minority Shareholders' Rights
Unformatted Document Text:  analysis. In addition, characteristics of the board of directors, such as board size, board composition and interlocking directorates were collected to measure the degree of independence of the board of each company. Dependent Variable - Expropriation of Minority Shareholders’ Rights Measuring expropriation of minority shareholders’ rights can be difficult given its numerous definitions and manifestations. However, emerging markets research suggests that concentrated ownership is correlated with a lack of investor protection (Claessens, Djankov, & Lang, 2000; Denis & McConnell, 2003; La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, & Shleifer, 1999; La Porta et al., 1998; Shleifer &Vishny, 1997). Thus, a measure of ownership concentration of the top five blockholders may be used to assess the degree of expropriation of minority shareholders’ rights. Following prior research on ownership concentration (Claessens et al., 2000; Demsetz & Lehn, 1985; Goergen & Renneboog, 2001; Nenova, 2003), this study utilizes the Herfindahl index (HI) to measure ownership concentration and to proxy for the expropriation of minority shareholders’ rights. This index captures both the inequality of shares among stockholders and the number of shareholders as well as better reflecting the true levels of ownership concentration in any company (Barabanov & McNamara, 2002). The HI is usually calculated as the sum of squares of the shareholdings of a certain number of stockholders. For this study, the top ultimate share blockholders holding at or above the five percent level is used. To calculate the HI, the ultimate ownership of both direct and indirect control and cash flows rights of each firm in the sample was traced for each of the three years (2000 – 2002) under consideration. To do so, the direct ownership of control rights for all owners with stakes at or above a five percent threshold was determined. Then the ultimate control of these direct owners was traced, using the same threshold of five percent ownership. Form 20-F usually traces the identity of ultimate control owners with at least five percent ownership. When the Form 20-F did not provide the necessary information for determining the ultimate owners, other sources of information were utilized, such as the web pages of the companies. Once these ultimate owners are identified, control rights are determined for the sample company and categorized into one of the following groups: family-management ownership group, non-affiliated company ownership group, government ownership group, institutional ownership group, individual ownership group, and miscellaneous ownership group, following Lins (2003). Included in the first group are family members (based on overlapping last names or known familial relations) and any management official or director. The non-affiliated company ownership group consists of ownership by other companies not affiliated with family-management. Direct and indirect ownership by all the agencies and companies identified as state-owned comprise the government ownership group. The institutional ownership group includes ownership held by pension funds, insurance companies, and/or banks. Individuals who are not family members or mangers

Authors: Santiago-Castro, Marisela. and Brown, Cynthia.
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analysis.        In  addition,  characteristics  of  the  board  of  directors,  such  as  board  size,  board  composition  and  interlocking 
directorates were collected to measure the degree of independence of the board of each company.   
Dependent Variable - Expropriation of Minority Shareholders’ Rights 
 
Measuring  expropriation  of  minority  shareholders’  rights  can  be  difficult  given  its  numerous  definitions  and 
manifestations.    However,  emerging  markets  research  suggests  that  concentrated  ownership  is  correlated  with  a  lack  of 
investor protection (Claessens, Djankov, & Lang, 2000; Denis & McConnell, 2003; La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, & Shleifer, 
1999;  La  Porta  et  al.,  1998;  Shleifer  &Vishny,  1997).    Thus,  a  measure  of  ownership  concentration  of  the  top  five 
blockholders may be used to assess the degree of expropriation of minority shareholders’ rights.   
Following  prior  research  on  ownership  concentration  (Claessens  et  al.,  2000;  Demsetz  &  Lehn,  1985;  Goergen  & 
Renneboog, 2001; Nenova, 2003), this study utilizes the Herfindahl index (HI) to  measure ownership concentration and to 
proxy  for  the  expropriation  of  minority  shareholders’  rights.    This  index  captures  both  the  inequality  of  shares  among 
stockholders  and  the  number  of  shareholders  as  well  as  better  reflecting  the  true  levels  of  ownership  concentration  in  any 
company  (Barabanov  &  McNamara,  2002).    The  HI  is  usually  calculated  as  the  sum  of  squares  of  the  shareholdings  of  a 
certain number of stockholders.  For this study, the top ultimate share blockholders holding at or above the five percent level 
is used.   
To calculate the HI, the ultimate ownership of both direct and indirect control and cash flows rights of each firm in 
the  sample  was  traced  for  each  of  the  three  years  (2000  –  2002)  under  consideration.    To  do  so,  the  direct  ownership  of 
control rights for all owners with stakes at or above a five percent threshold was determined.  Then the ultimate control of 
these direct owners was traced, using the same threshold of five percent ownership.  Form 20-F usually traces the identity of 
ultimate control owners with at least five percent ownership.  When the Form 20-F did not provide the necessary information 
for determining the ultimate owners, other sources of information were utilized, such as the web pages of the companies.   
Once  these  ultimate  owners  are  identified,  control  rights  are  determined  for  the  sample  company  and  categorized 
into  one  of  the  following  groups:    family-management  ownership  group,  non-affiliated  company  ownership  group, 
government  ownership  group,  institutional  ownership  group,  individual  ownership  group,  and  miscellaneous  ownership 
group, following  Lins (2003).  Included in the  first  group are family  members (based on overlapping last  names or known 
familial  relations)  and  any  management  official  or  director.    The  non-affiliated  company  ownership  group  consists  of 
ownership by other companies not affiliated with family-management.  Direct and indirect ownership by all the agencies and 
companies identified as state-owned comprise the government ownership group.  The institutional ownership group includes 
ownership held by pension funds, insurance companies, and/or banks.  Individuals who are not family members or mangers 


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