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Informal Punishment for Noncompliance and Reward for Compliance as Inhibitors of Organizational Rule Violation

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Abstract:

Previous studies using deterrence theory, most of which have been conducted in the United States, focus only on punishment for crime/delinquency and on legal or formal punishment for such behaviors. The current paper integrates differential association/social learning theory into Grasmick’s extended deterrence theory to propose that rational actors, in deciding whether or not to comply with workplace rules, consider not only informal punishments for noncompliance but also informal rewards for compliance. Specifically, in addition to socially-imposed embarrassment and self-imposed shame, employees contemplating rule violation are assumed to take into account the certainty and magnitude of two types of informal rewards – socially-repaid praise and self-repaid pride. All four punishment threats and reward anticipations are proposed to be deterrents to employee noncompliance with organizational rules. The relative effects of praise and embarrassment, as well as those of pride and shame, on people’s intentions to violate three rules are then examined in samples of employees in a Japanese and a U.S hospital. The analysis of identical survey data reveals that threats of punishment for noncompliance are stronger deterrents than are anticipations of reward for compliance. However, the results from the Japanese sample indicate that praise and pride are not significant inhibitors of deviance.
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Association:
Name: ASC Annual Meeting
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http://www.asc41.com


Citation:
URL: http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p371686_index.html
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MLA Citation:

Kobayashi, Emiko. "Informal Punishment for Noncompliance and Reward for Compliance as Inhibitors of Organizational Rule Violation" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the ASC Annual Meeting, Philadelphia Marriott Downtown, Philadelphia, PA, Nov 04, 2009 <Not Available>. 2014-11-28 <http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p371686_index.html>

APA Citation:

Kobayashi, E. , 2009-11-04 "Informal Punishment for Noncompliance and Reward for Compliance as Inhibitors of Organizational Rule Violation" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the ASC Annual Meeting, Philadelphia Marriott Downtown, Philadelphia, PA <Not Available>. 2014-11-28 from http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p371686_index.html

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: Previous studies using deterrence theory, most of which have been conducted in the United States, focus only on punishment for crime/delinquency and on legal or formal punishment for such behaviors. The current paper integrates differential association/social learning theory into Grasmick’s extended deterrence theory to propose that rational actors, in deciding whether or not to comply with workplace rules, consider not only informal punishments for noncompliance but also informal rewards for compliance. Specifically, in addition to socially-imposed embarrassment and self-imposed shame, employees contemplating rule violation are assumed to take into account the certainty and magnitude of two types of informal rewards – socially-repaid praise and self-repaid pride. All four punishment threats and reward anticipations are proposed to be deterrents to employee noncompliance with organizational rules. The relative effects of praise and embarrassment, as well as those of pride and shame, on people’s intentions to violate three rules are then examined in samples of employees in a Japanese and a U.S hospital. The analysis of identical survey data reveals that threats of punishment for noncompliance are stronger deterrents than are anticipations of reward for compliance. However, the results from the Japanese sample indicate that praise and pride are not significant inhibitors of deviance.


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