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1. Introduction
If Iran acquires nuclear weapons or the capability to construct them on short notice, will
other regional states attempt to acquire them as well? If North Korea does not give up,
enlarges, or further weaponizes the modest nuclear arsenal it appears to have already
acquired, will others follow suit? How likely is such “reactive proliferation”? Under what
conditions is it more or less likely, and therefore what tools might policymakers in the
United States and elsewhere have to forestall further proliferation?
Policymakers in Washington and elsewhere are exceptionally concerned about the
potential for “reactive proliferation,” especially in response to Iran’s apparent pursuit of a
nuclear weapons option. To cite just one of many similar examples, President Barack
Obama told Al Arabiya in a 2009 interview that “[Iran’s] pursuit of a nuclear
weapon…could potentially set off an arms race in the region.”
1
And Director of Central
Intelligence George Tenet famously told Congress in 2003 that as a consequence of
North Korea’s proliferation, “The desire for nuclear weapons is on the upsurge.
Additional countries may decide to seek nuclear weapons as it becomes clear their
neighbors and regional rivals are already doing so. The ‘domino theory’ of the 21st
century may well be nuclear.”
2
Reactive proliferation pessimism among policymakers is consistent with the
views of many scholars and policy analysts, who are highly pessimistic about the
potential for proliferation cascades, avalanches, chain reactions, epidemics, waves, or
1
Transcript, “President Gives First Interview Since Taking Office to Arab TV; Obama Tells Al Arabiya
Peace
Talks
Should
Resume”
January
27,
2009,
accessed
October
9,
2009
at
http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2009/01/27/65087.html#004.
2
Michael R. Gordon with Felicity Barringer, “Nuclear Standoff: North Korea Wants Arms and More Aid
from U.S.” New York Times February 13, 2003.
Convention