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Selective Incentives and the Rational Design of Inter-State Institutions

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Abstract:

This paper argues that minor monetary incentives can nudge state organizations to work more closely together to create a new institution in a new issue-domain. Over time, these incentives thicken the bonds of trust among members and reduce uncertainty regarding how other members will behave in the future. Eventually, the member organizations agree to delegate additional power and responsibility to the new institution. Six theoretical conjectures are tested based on the pool of variables developed in 2001 by the authors of the Rational Design of International Institutions approach (RD). Three of these conjectures refine existing RD concepts (“Distribution” and “Number”). The other three conjectures compliment RD theory by analyzing the impact of q new variable (“Selective Incentives”) on the relationship among existing RD concepts (Distribution, Uncertainty, Control, Scope, and Flexibility). The conjectures are examined against the first-ever political history accounts of the creation of the Australian Public Sector Mapping Agencies (PSMA) agency and the European EuroGeographics (EG) organization in the new geo-spatial domain. The RD framework proved to be a flexible approach for a study of the ‘creation years’ of new institutions.

Author's Keywords:

Rational Design, Institution, Spatial Data; Selective Incentives; Public Sector; Europe; Australia
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Association:
Name: ISPP 36th Annual Scientific Meeting
URL:
http://ispp.org


Citation:
URL: http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p651285_index.html
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MLA Citation:

Peled, Alon. "Selective Incentives and the Rational Design of Inter-State Institutions" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the ISPP 36th Annual Scientific Meeting, Lauder School of Government, Diplomacy and Strategy, IDC–Herzliya, Herzliya, Israel, Jul 04, 2013 <Not Available>. 2014-12-11 <http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p651285_index.html>

APA Citation:

Peled, A. , 2013-07-04 "Selective Incentives and the Rational Design of Inter-State Institutions" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the ISPP 36th Annual Scientific Meeting, Lauder School of Government, Diplomacy and Strategy, IDC–Herzliya, Herzliya, Israel <Not Available>. 2014-12-11 from http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p651285_index.html

Publication Type: Paper (prepared oral presentation)
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: This paper argues that minor monetary incentives can nudge state organizations to work more closely together to create a new institution in a new issue-domain. Over time, these incentives thicken the bonds of trust among members and reduce uncertainty regarding how other members will behave in the future. Eventually, the member organizations agree to delegate additional power and responsibility to the new institution. Six theoretical conjectures are tested based on the pool of variables developed in 2001 by the authors of the Rational Design of International Institutions approach (RD). Three of these conjectures refine existing RD concepts (“Distribution” and “Number”). The other three conjectures compliment RD theory by analyzing the impact of q new variable (“Selective Incentives”) on the relationship among existing RD concepts (Distribution, Uncertainty, Control, Scope, and Flexibility). The conjectures are examined against the first-ever political history accounts of the creation of the Australian Public Sector Mapping Agencies (PSMA) agency and the European EuroGeographics (EG) organization in the new geo-spatial domain. The RD framework proved to be a flexible approach for a study of the ‘creation years’ of new institutions.


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