Guest  

 
Search: 
Search By: SubjectAbstractAuthorTitleFull-Text

 

Showing 1 through 1 of 1 records.
2007 - International Studies Association 48th Annual Convention Pages: 34 pages || Words: unavailable || 
Info
1. Pahre, Robert. "International Cooperation as Interagency Cooperation: Examples from Wildlife and Habitat Preservation" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association 48th Annual Convention, Hilton Chicago, CHICAGO, IL, USA, Feb 28, 2007 <Not Available>. 2019-10-17 <http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p180922_index.html>
Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: International treaties are generally negotiated and signed by national bureaucracies. This simple fact has wider implications for our study of international cooperation than scholars have previously recognized. National bureaucracies also negotiate agreements?such as memoranda of understanding?with one another. Despite being governed by a single domestic legal system in theory, implementation and enforcement of these domestic agreements are essentially political, and agencies . The US Departments of Interior and Agriculture, for example, do not sue each other over violations of any agreement, and only rarely refer disputes to a higher political level (the President). In short, cooperation between two agencies presents essentially the same problem whether these agencies are found in different countries or in the same country. This similarity is generally overlooked because the issues over which agencies negotiate often differ?defense and trade policy at the international level, transportation or land use at the domestic level. Demonstrating the analytical similarity of international cooperation to interagency cooperation therefore requires holding issue area constant while allowing interstate and intrastate units to vary. To do this, I focus on cooperation over wildlife and habitat preservation at three levels of government in the US and Canada: federal, state, and tribal. I explain this variation in cooperation in a simple theory in which agency goals and certain features of habitats interact. Variation between successful and unsuccessful cooperation in this issue area is governed solely by characteristics of the habitat and agency goals, and does not depend on whether a problem is ?international? or ?domestic.? Thinking of international cooperation as a form of interagency cooperation should change the way we analyze international cooperation. For scholars who think in terms of nation-states interacting either in an anarchic international system, this points to a very different unit of analysis. For those who emphasize the domestic politics of international cooperation, this moves us away from executives constrained by legislatures to look at sub-units within each executive, perhaps acting as delegates of a legislative principal.


©2019 All Academic, Inc.   |   All Academic Privacy Policy