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2010 - Seventeenth International Conference of the Council for European Studies Pages: unavailable || Words: 374 words || 
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1. Schoenman, Roger. "The Business of Collective Action: The Effect of Ownership Networks on Joint Political Activity Among Firms" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Seventeenth International Conference of the Council for European Studies, Grand Plaza, Montreal, Canada, Apr 15, 2010 Online <APPLICATION/PDF>. 2018-11-17 <http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p399789_index.html>
Publication Type: Individual Paper
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: Individual firms each have their own means and goals but rarely sufficient influence to choose policies alone. What matters with regard to business collective action is how firms are able to coordinate to achieve political goals. The question this paper addresses is: what are the incentives for joint political action among firms generated by different forms of ownership? Do economies based on family firms have different patterns of political action than those where financial firms dominate?

Since networks are one key component structuring the ability of elites to collaborate, study of a key form of network – ownership ties between firms – is of particular interest. Hence, the goal of the paper is to understand the political incentives of firms in different ownership and governance configurations.

The interactions of economic and political elites likely have one broad goal – to shape regulation and the choice of institutions in their own favor. Different forms of ownership are matched by different opportunities for owners to exert influence and control (Keister and Windolf 2002). Hence, whether ownership is broad or narrow will have a determining effect on the emergence of joint action, as will the closely related identity of owners. The types of actors inhabiting important positions in this network will determine what types of policies are supported: to take just two examples, banks and institutional investors will more likely support new institutions while family firms will favor the status quo. The paper tests these propositions with empirical data from six countries in post-socialist Europe.


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