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Showing 1 through 4 of 4 records.
2007 - North American Chapter of the International Group for the Psychology of Mathematics Education Pages: 3 pages || Words: 1188 words || 
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1. Bruce, Catherine. and Ross, John. "Tools for Implementing Standards-Based Teaching for Low Achievers: A mixed methods study of grade 7, 8, & 9 students learning of fractions" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the North American Chapter of the International Group for the Psychology of Mathematics Education, University of Nevada, Reno, Reno, Nevada, Oct 25, 2007 Online <PDF>. 2019-10-15 <http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p189470_index.html>
Publication Type: Short Research Paper
Abstract: This study examines effects of the implementation of content specific and student-need specific computer-based learning tasks with students struggling to learn about fractions. We employed a three-phase mixed methods approach with 89 teachers of Grades 7, 8 and 9 to test a model for increasing lower performing students’ understanding, confidence, and achievement within the classroom context.

2015 - SRCD Biennial Meeting Words: 477 words || 
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2. Lucenet, Joanna. and Blaye, Agnes. "Do children adjust cognitive control to the context: a study in 7- and 9-year-olds" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the SRCD Biennial Meeting, Pennsylvania Convention Center and the Philadelphia Marriott Downtown Hotel, Philadelphia, PA, Mar 19, 2015 <Not Available>. 2019-10-15 <http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p960112_index.html>
Publication Type: Individual Poster
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: Whereas many complex situations require cognitive control—a set of processes enabling the regulation of one’s thoughts and behaviors towards goals— the diversity of situations raises the question of whether the engagement of cognitive control can be adjusted to environmental constraints. There is now evidence that adults modulate their control processes according to the context (e.g., conflict adaptation effects, Botvinick et al., 2001; Gratton, 1992). This question has however been under-investigated in children. Hence, it was the main focus of the present study, where control adjustments were assessed using a task-switching paradigm that contrasted two frequencies of switches. Bonnin et al. (2011) showed that adults were more efficient at setting goals when switch frequency was low. In contrast, switch per se required more time for low than high switch frequency. According to Duthoo et al. (2012), this adaptation would depend on the expectation of switches, in other words on participants’ ability to retrieve and maintain the relevant task goal in advance of stimuli (i.e. proactive control). Knowing whether children younger than 9 are able of proactive control is another open question. A subgoal of this study was then to assess the proactive vs. reactive nature of children’s control using an AX-Continuous Performance Test (AX-CPT; Braver et al., 2001). We hypothesized that control modulation, if any, would be observed in children already able of engaging proactive control.
Thirty three 7-year-olds and thirty three 9-year-olds performed an AX-CPT and a cued task-switching experiment in two switch frequency conditions (low vs. high). Bivalent stimuli(e.g., blue dog) were presented on a screen in a two-cell grid. Children were asked to sort stimuli according to their shape or their color by pressing one of two response keys. The task was indexed by an arbitrary cue presented ahead of the stimulus (i.e., the location of the fixation cross in the upper or lower cell of the grid). Both age groups were found to use a proactive form of control in the AX-CPT. Examining task-switching performance, we found evidence for a control modulation in both age groups: Considering error rates, children were more efficient in setting goals when the switch frequency was low (p < .05), and on the contrary were more effective in switching when the frequency was high (p < .01). This modulation did not appear on reaction times.
Altogether, these findings provide evidence on two critical abilities in school-aged children: They can anticipate the upcoming task goals and they can also adjust their control to the context. Although these results are consistent with Duthoo et al. (2012)’s proposal, further research is needed to test whether younger children – who may primarily engage a reactive control – would already be sensitive to context changes. Furthermore, they open a new avenue to address executive difficulties associated to some developmental disorders: To what extent do these difficulties rely on erratic, or lack of, adjustments of control?

2015 - SRCD Biennial Meeting Words: 474 words || 
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3. Zaleskiewicz, Tomasz. and Gasiorowska, Agata. "Intelligence and Economic Knowledge Predict Saving in Children from 7 to 9 Years of Age" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the SRCD Biennial Meeting, Pennsylvania Convention Center and the Philadelphia Marriott Downtown Hotel, Philadelphia, PA, <Not Available>. 2019-10-15 <http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p961705_index.html>
Publication Type: Presentation
Abstract: Research suggests that young children think about saving for short-term goals but do not understand saving for long-term goals until the age of 11-12. By age of six, children know that saving is good, because it is related to exercising self-control, thrift, and patience. However, they do not necessarily enjoy saving and do not perform well at it. Between the ages six and twelve, children develop more abstract economic reasoning and better understanding of the value of saving and learn that saving in a bank protects their money from being spent by themselves or others. Therefore, long-term saving may be considered a skill that is determined by capacities for self-control and delay of gratification, which are associated with individual differences in cognitive processing and intelligence. Saving skills also seem to be related to the level of economic knowledge possessed by children. Although the level of economic knowledge is linked to children’s cognitive abilities, it might also depend on other factors, such as social context or social practices.

Most of the studies examining children's saving have been performed as in-depth interviews or short-term lab experiments. By contrast, we used a longitudinal classroom study to test how cognitive abilities and economic knowledge influence real saving success in Polish children from age 7 to age 9 (n = 87). We measured children’s economic knowledge with ten forced-choice questions, and their cognitive capabilities with the Raven Matrices Test. We also organized a saving game that consisted of five meetings with children over the span of five months.

During the first meeting children received two play banknotes. They were also informed that they would meet the experimenter four more times, and receive two additional banknotes at each meeting. At each meeting, children had to make the decision of whether to save money or to spend it on small toys. However, they were aware that if they saved all banknotes over the course of the whole game, they could buy one more valuable toy. Reaching the saving goal served as the first dependent variable. In addition to recording children's behavior in the saving game, we monitored the real saving behavior of children between September 2010 and June 2011. The number of contributions to the School Saving Bank (SKO) served as the second dependent variable.

We found that older children showed higher levels of economic knowledge and more advanced cognitive abilities. They were also more prone to save all of their banknotes in the economic game and made more contributions to SKO than younger children. After controlling for age and gender, the score on the intelligence test together with economic knowledge significantly predicted the number of contributions to SKO (R2 = 25%) and the success in the saving game (Nagerkelke R2 = 31%), see Table 1. These findings indicate that economic knowledge and intelligence have important effects on observed saving behavior in children.

2015 - SRCD Biennial Meeting Pages: unavailable || Words: unavailable || 
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4. Wertz, Annie., Kominsky, Jonathan., Strickland, Brent., Keil, Frank. and Wynn, Karen. "9-Month-Olds, But Not 7-Month-Olds, Show Sensitivity to Principles of Newtonian Physics in Causal Launching Events" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the SRCD Biennial Meeting, Pennsylvania Convention Center and the Philadelphia Marriott Downtown Hotel, Philadelphia, PA, Mar 19, 2015 <Not Available>. 2019-10-15 <http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p957026_index.html>
Publication Type: Individual Poster
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: One of the most remarkable features of human perception is its ability to represent causation. Here we demonstrate that causal perception is sensitive to certain principles of Newtonian mechanics in collision events in adults and infants as young as 9 months of age. Consider two balls, A and B, with A moving towards B at 1 m/s and B at rest. When A contacts B, A stops moving and B begins moving in the same direction. According to Newtonian mechanics of elastic collisions, B cannot move faster than 2 m/s in this example, even if A were infinitely more massive than B. While causal perception may not represent this speed limit precisely, we propose that adults and infants will be sensitive to violations of this principle. However, they should not be sensitive to events with similarly asymmetric speed ratios (e.g., A moving at 3 m/s and B moving at 1 m/s) that are possible if B is much more massive.

In Experiment 1, we presented adults with three collision events simultaneously, each of which continuously repeated. The objects in these events had two possible speeds, one slow ("1") and one fast ("3"). In one collision event, both objects moved at speed 1, so the speed ratio of the two objects (A:B) was 1:1. In the second event, both moved at speed 3 (3:3). In the third event, the “launching” object moved at one speed and the “launched” object moved at the other. The asymmetric speed ratio of this target event was either possible under Newtonian mechanics (3:1) or impossible (1:3). Adults were asked to identify the asymmetric event as quickly as possible. Adults were significantly faster to detect physically impossible asymmetric events (1:3) than physically possible ones (3:1), t(12) = -3.751, p = .003. However, they were equally fast to detect both speed ratios in non-causal events, specifically a temporal gap, spatial gap, or "slip" overlap event, ps >= .16 (Fig. 1).

In Experiment 2, we examined the developmental origins of this sensitivity. One possibility is that this sensitivity is a core component of causal perception and emerges with it around 6 months (Leslie & Keeble, 1987). A second possibility is that the visual sensitivity to impossible launching events is a distinct capacity and emerges only after causal perception is in place. In our study, 7-month-old infants (N = 16, 8 male, average age 6;27) and 9-month-old infants (N = 15, 7 male, average age 9;15) were habituated to 1:1 launching events. Following habituation, they saw a single asymmetric launching event at either a possible (3:1) or impossible (1:3) speed ratio, between-subjects. 9-month-olds looked significantly longer at impossible events than possible events, t(13) = 2.37, p = .034. However, 7-month-olds looked equally long at both event types, t(14) = 1.27, p = .22 (Fig. 2). Data collection is currently underway on non-causal control conditions. Thus far, these results suggest that sensitivity to the Newtonian principles governing collision events emerges after infants’ ability to detect causal launching events.


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