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2016 - American Political Science Association Annual Meeting Words: 217 words || 
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1. Gavin, Michael. and Manger, Mark. "Capital Flows, Exchanges Rates, and the Political Economy of High Beta Economies" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, TBA, Philadelphia, PA, Aug 31, 2016 <Not Available>. 2019-05-19 <http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p1118668_index.html>
Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: One of the few matters on which there is near-consensus in international economics is that in a world of mobile capital, countries benefit from having floating currencies and a central bank that targets inflation. Many developing countries in Latin America, Southern Africa and Asia have adopted this policy in the aftermath of the financial crises of the 1990s and early 2000s. Yet there is considerably variation in how countries react when their exchange rate depreciates: some let adjustment run its course, others raise interest rates in a pro-cyclical and often futile attempt to stem capital flows. Existing theories, however, offer little guidance to explain exchange rate management under floating regimes.

In this paper, we argue that governments face several challenges, among them exchange rate pass-through, currency mismatches between local and foreign debt, and global volatility that affects some countries more than others—which we call “high-beta economies.” Nonetheless, their reactions depend on political economy factors: Left-wing or populist governments are less likely to raise interest rates but instead impose capital controls, while more business-friendly governments are ready to follow the economic textbook and pursue policies that create short-term pain but long-term gains —unless, that his, if elections are approaching. We use a vector autoregression approach on a sample of developing countries with de-facto floating exchange rates to provide evidence.

2005 - International Studies Association Words: 152 words || 
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2. "The Political Economy of Banking Crises in Emerging Economies: The Veto Player Framework" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Hilton Hawaiian Village, Honolulu, Hawaii, Mar 05, 2005 <Not Available>. 2019-05-19 <http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p71721_index.html>
Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: Recent research on the consequences of financial crises has attempted to determine which crisis-management policies and which economic policies should be responsible for the severe costs of these crises. Less attention has been paid to the roles of domestic political institutions that directly influence a government's ability to implement these policies. This paper investigates the impact of domestic institutions characterized by the veto player framework on the severity of banking crises measured in terms of the magnitude of output losses by extending MacIntyre's (2001) study of the relationship between the veto players and policy risks for Asian financial crises. From a sample of emerging market economies, the empirical finding illustrates that countries with an absence of veto powers in their political system or with excessive veto players will severely suffer from a larger magnitude of output losses once banking crises occur due to the lack of credibility and flexibility of policy responses.

2008 - ISA's 49th ANNUAL CONVENTION, BRIDGING MULTIPLE DIVIDES Words: 409 words || 
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3. Ellison, David. "On the Political Economy of Subnational Regionalism: The Role of the New Economy" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the ISA's 49th ANNUAL CONVENTION, BRIDGING MULTIPLE DIVIDES, Hilton San Francisco, SAN FRANCISCO, CA, USA, Mar 26, 2008 <Not Available>. 2019-05-19 <http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p252925_index.html>
Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: Nowhere is the gap between winners and losers in the Central and East European (CEE) transition more evident than in its subnational, cross-regional variation. Both globalization and economic integration in the European marketplace have strongly impacted the geographic and regional distribution of the benefits and costs of integrating markets. Declining activity rates and purchasing power in the less advanced CEE regions and rapidly increasing economic disparities across more and less advanced CEE regions place significant burdens on the future outlook of these less developed regions. Empirical evidence suggests that in CEE the real losers of European integration are low and unskilled workers with little education in declining regions. Variation in regional rates of economic growth and development is of course not news in the wider European Union. Despite evidence of increasing economic convergence across states, increasing regional disparities are a global phenomenon (Sala-I-Martin, 2002) and are likewise well recognized in the European context (Quah, 1996). The appearance of regional disparities in CEE however represents one of the greatest challenges both to the political and economic stability of CEE and to the Union as a whole. This is above all the case because the less developed regions of CEE have experienced some of the worst features of the economic transition.FDI has flowed far more strongly to CEE’s more developed regions, indirectly contributing to rising economic disparities across the more and less advanced regions. And economic decline in the CEE’s less advanced regions has thus far not been stemmed by attempts at creating regional support mechanisms. Central governments themselves are torn between investing in the less developed regions and cementing economic development at the national level (Ellison, 2007). Thus the question remains how best to promote the economic development of the less developed regions.What strategies should be employed to attract investment to and build employment in these regions remains controversial. This paper asks what can be done? Will EU structural and cohesion funds or the Lisbon Agenda help reverse these trends? Can more FDI be directed to the less developed regions of Central and Eastern Europe through other public policy tools? This paper will provide an empirical analysis of the factors influencing subnational regional economic development. Using data on the subnational regional distribution of FDI flows, this paper will ask what factors best explain the regional distribution of FDI flows and will further explore the impact of this and other variables—in particular New Economy models—on the prospects for regional economic development.

2003 - American Political Science Association Pages: 40 pages || Words: 10372 words || 
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4. Van Loo, Jonathan. "Political Clientelism and the Political Economy of Corruption in Transition Economies" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Philadelphia Marriott Hotel, Philadelphia, PA, Aug 27, 2003 <Not Available>. 2019-05-19 <http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p64185_index.html>
Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: Using the BEEPS survey of about 4000 firms in transition economies developed by the World Bank and the EBRD, this paper tests hypotheses concerning the causes of the political behavior of firms in transition economies. The evidence supports the hypothesis that clientelist relations between firms and the state, which have been shown to have detrimental effects on economic growth and income equality elsewhere in the world, exist in many transition economies. The results suggest that the corruption and crony capitalism observed in many transition countries is generated by firms and state officials who find themselves involved in an interdependent political and economic relationship. In a system of political clientelism, firms provide political support to politicians, and in exchange politicians distribute economic benefits to client firms. High-level corruption in transition economies is generated by personalistic, hierarchical, asymmetrical, clientelist links between firms and government officials rather than the lobbying activity of pressure groups acting on a weak state. Ordered logit analysis of the determinants of firm overdue payments, or payment arrears, shows that large, privatized firms hold higher payment arrears in clientelist countries, while these factors have no impact on arrears in countries with low levels of clientelism. The evidence suggests that the extent of political clientelism has a major impact on corruption and economic policy, regardless of the extent of private ownership in the economy. This analysis of the political behavior of firms and the economic policy environment has important policy implications for all countries implementing market-oriented economic reform and attempting to reduce corruption. Questions concerning the treatment of state-owned versus privatized firms in clientelist countries will be pursued in further research.

2007 - WESTERN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION Pages: 37 pages || Words: 10951 words || 
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5. Caviedes, Alex. "The European Strategy for becoming a Knowledge-Based Economy? The Political Economy of IT Specialist Migration" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the WESTERN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION, La Riviera Hotel, Las Vegas, Nevada, Mar 08, 2007 <Not Available>. 2019-05-19 <http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p176224_index.html>
Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: Rapid advances in the processing and transfer of information place a premium on firms and business systems with the ability to innovate and quickly re-marshal resources. These demands have exposed technology and know-how gaps in even the most technologically advanced industrial nations. Globalization can lead to convergent policy responses, especially in industries such as Information Technology (IT) that tap into an international labor market. Germany and the United Kingdom have responded similarly by resorting to foreign labor recruitment to support the new economy. However, their path to this common response has involved different levels of domestic political mobilization that reflect nationally variant immigration legacies, systems of innovation and training and levels of social partner involvement. A comparison of the German Green Card program, the UK’s sector-based scheme for IT workers, and IT sector policies adopted in Austria and the Netherlands illustrates the central importance of government pro-activity and emphasizes how general labor market characteristics such as egalitarian wages and high levels of social partner involvement produce qualitatively different policy results. The policy tracing relies on media reports, organization and government position papers, and is buttressed by interviews with representatives of government and the social partners.

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