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2016 - American Political Science Association Annual Meeting Pages: unavailable || Words: unavailable || 
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1. Mebane, Walter., Klaver, Joe. and Woods, Logan. "Election Complaints, Election Anomalies, and Election Frauds" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, TBA, Philadelphia, PA, Sep 01, 2016 <Not Available>. 2018-09-20 <http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p1127396_index.html>
Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: Election results are frequently disputed. Whether these disputes arise out of problems with preelection administration, incidents on election day at the polls, or questionable results after the fact, elections are contentious by definition. The institutions used to mediate these disputes vary widely across countries, both in their organization as well as in their de jure and de facto roles in a given polity. We explore these arrangements and their consequences in detail across three cases: Germany (citizens' postelection complaints); Mexico (parties' election nullification petitions); and the United States (HAVA-mandated citizens complaints). The nature of election disputes and complaints, and their geographic incidence, also provides insight into the barriers faced by voters and other political actors across societies. Whether individuals are complaining about the fact that their absentee ballot was lost in the mail or that they were blocked from voting by armed militia members, these disputes can provide a snapshot into the functioning of elections in a country from the perspective of everyday citizens. In some systems, however, as in Mexico, citizen complaints have generally been mediated through the political parties. We examine how the postelection complaints relate to measures of election anomalies and frauds derived from vote data. Of particular interest are methods that use vote data to estimate "frauds" probabilities for individual polling stations and precincts. Relationships between such measures and the complaints can help as we try to determine whether the "frauds" measures trace back to maleficent activities and whether the complaints stem from genuine problems in the administration of elections.

2005 - The Midwest Political Science Association Words: 37 words || 
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2. Hyde, Susan. "Election Boycotts, Election Observers, and Competition: Do International Observers Give Parties an Incentive to Boycott Elections?" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the The Midwest Political Science Association, Palmer House Hilton, Chicago, Illinois, Apr 07, 2005 <Not Available>. 2018-09-20 <http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p86915_index.html>
Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: If international observers are a signal that the election will be objectively evaluated according to international standards, and are associated with free and fair elections, why do opposition parties boycott the election even when they are present?

2004 - American Political Science Association Pages: 30 pages || Words: 8096 words || 
Info
3. Hyde, Susan. "Election Observers, Election Boycotts, and Competition: Do International Observers Increase the Chances that an Opposition Party Will Boycott the Election?" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Hilton Chicago and the Palmer House Hilton, Chicago, IL, Sep 02, 2004 <Not Available>. 2018-09-20 <http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p61438_index.html>
Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: The interaction between opposition parties and international actors during the volatile democratization process has been seldom studied. This paper explores this relationship from 1990-2000 and finds that, controlling for the level of electoral competition, the presence of international observers increases the probability that an opposition party will choose to boycott the election. We argue that this interaction occurs because opposition parties recognize that, under specific circumstances, an election boycott can draw additional international attention to electoral fraud and serve to discredit an incumbent who is striving to be recognized as democratic.

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