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2004 - American Political Science Association Pages: 33 pages || Words: 13167 words || 
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1. Koger, Gregory. "Pivots For Sale: Transaction Costs, Endogenous Rules, and Pivotal Politics" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Hilton Chicago and the Palmer House Hilton, Chicago, IL, Sep 02, 2004 <Not Available>. 2020-02-22 <http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p60242_index.html>
Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: Filibustering may require physical effort and political risk. Senate
majorities, if provoked, can reduce or eliminate the right to
filibuster. Thus I propose a revised "option" version of Keith
Krehbiel's pivot model in which legislative rights are costly and
endogenous. I test this model and find that 1) legislation often passes
the Senate without enough support to shut off a filibuster, suggesting
that obstruction has been deterred. 2) Even when obstruction costs are
low, the threat of institutional change may deter filibusters on issues
like Supreme Court nominations or debt limit increases. 3) the option
model helps explain why the size of voting coalitions increased
dramatically during the 20th century. I suggest this change is due to
historical evolution of transaction costs: filibustering has gotten
easier while reform threats have become more costly. By one measure of
workload, the median coalition size has grown about 24 percent since 1900 due
to changing transaction costs.

2004 - American Political Science Association Pages: 37 pages || Words: 11661 words || 
Info
2. Primo, David. "Restrictive Rules, Restrained Spending: The Endogenous Enforcement of Spending Limits in Legislatures" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Hilton Chicago and the Palmer House Hilton, Chicago, IL, Sep 02, 2004 <Not Available>. 2020-02-22 <http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p59290_index.html>
Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: Using a distributive politics bargaining model that allows for pork-barrel (i.e., inefficient) projects, I demonstrate that legislatures tend to prefer open, or unrestricted, amendment rules on spending bills, while agenda setters prefer closed, or restrictive, rules. This result contrasts with Baron and Ferejohn’s (1989) seminal work on bargaining, which finds that closed rules are preferred both by the legislature as a whole and the proposer. The model is applied to the problem of legislative rule enforcement by tying the agenda setter’s adherence to a spending limit to the legislature’s granting of a closed rule on the proposal. I find that endogenous enforcement of a spending limit is possible if the voting rule is a simple majority (or close to it). This enforcement mechanism tends to fail for supermajority rules. The approach in this paper sheds new light on the design and enforcement of budget rules in legislatures.

2006 - American Political Science Association Words: unavailable || 
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3. Baturo, Alexander. "Red Carpet Fever: Decision-Making During Presidential Succession and Endogenous Term Limits" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Marriott, Loews Philadelphia, and the Pennsylvania Convention Center, Philadelphia, PA, <Not Available>. 2020-02-22 <http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p153329_index.html>
Publication Type: Proceeding

2007 - American Political Science Association Pages: 24 pages || Words: 7547 words || 
Info
4. Bassi, Anna. "A Model of Endogenous Government Formation" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Hyatt Regency Chicago and the Sheraton Chicago Hotel and Towers, Chicago, IL, Aug 30, 2007 <Not Available>. 2020-02-22 <http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p208807_index.html>
Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: Political parties bargain over the allocation of cabinet portfolios when forming coalition governments. The non-cooperative
theory of bargaining predicts that the ``formateur'' enjoys a disproportionate share of government ministries. However,
empirical evidence indicates that parties receive share of portfolios proportional to the amount of seats they control in the assembly, supporting Gamson's Law. This paper examines the bargaining over government formation as a process in which the role of formateur is determined endogenously in a model where legislators are assumed to care about both the allocation of cabinet positions and the content of the government policy platform. In equilibrium, if the parties have similar preferences over cabinets and policy, the share of ministerial positions will be proportional to the parties' size.

2007 - American Sociological Association Pages: 19 pages || Words: 8762 words || 
Info
5. Barmeyer, Mareike. "The endogenous orderliness of talk shows: Making things invisible and making things visible at the Trisha Show" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Sociological Association, TBA, New York, New York City, Aug 10, 2007 Online <PDF>. 2020-02-22 <http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p184011_index.html>
Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: To the television viewer, the studio audience appears as a spontaneous reacting single body, a crowd smoothly engaging in sequences of collective behaviour. Hidden is the enormous amount of management needed before, during and after the process of recording the show to create this impression. It is the work that goes into this management that is the focus of my analysis.
Using my fieldnotes to describe the work that is going on in talk shows, I am taking the path of an ethnographer. Coming from an ethnomethodological approach, however, the data presented are taken from fieldnotes, in which my own understandings and activities provide the phenomena for analysis.
As one of the things people do in talk shows is talk, I will also look closely at that talk, showing what is done through talk at particular moments in the show.

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