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2008 - APSA 2008 Annual Meeting Pages: 25 pages || Words: 12510 words || 
1. Schmidt, Vivien. "From Historical Institutionalism to Discursive Institutionalism: Explaining Institutional Change in Political Economy" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the APSA 2008 Annual Meeting, Hynes Convention Center, Boston, Massachusetts, Aug 28, 2008 Online <APPLICATION/PDF>. 2019-03-24 <>
Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: To explain change in comparative political economy, a ‘discursive institutionalist’ approach focused on ideas and discourse is a necessary complement to older ‘new institutionalist’ approaches. Historical institutionalist approaches have difficulty explaining change, tend to be static and equilibrium-focused; and even where they get beyond this through accounts of incremental change, they are more descriptive than they are explanatory of change. The turn to rational choice institutionalist approaches for agency, for ‘micro-foundations’ to historical institutionalist ‘macro-patterns,’ also does not solve the problems of historical institutionalism. A turn to discursive institutionalism could. Using examples of reforms in national political economies and welfare states, the paper illustrates how ideas and discourse help explain the dynamics of change (and continuity).

2006 - International Studies Association Words: 158 words || 
2. Dixon, Gregory. "Changing IGO Institutions and State Behavior: How Domestic Institutions Affect State Behavior in the Context of IGO Institutional Change" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Town & Country Resort and Convention Center, San Diego, California, USA, Mar 22, 2006 <Not Available>. 2019-03-24 <>
Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: As the UN, the EU, and several other significant IGO?s debate changes to their core institutions, institutional design at the IGO level has become a topic of great discussion among policy-makers. The design of IGO institutions is an important consideration in examining how member states act. Changes in IGO institutions will cause changes in member states? behavior, but these changes will not affect all member states equally. The character of the changes in the IGO institutions should affect member states differently depending on the nature of their domestic political institutions. Comparing dispute behavior at the GATT and WTO, this paper demonstrates how the change in the Dispute Settlement Mechanism within the trade regime had a greater effect on democratic states than one their non-democratic counterparts. At a time when a number of major IGO?s are seeking to change their institutions, this paper adds an important element to consider how such changes will affect the behavior of member states.

2005 - Southern Political Science Association Pages: 24 pages || Words: 11317 words || 
3. Gronke, Paul. and Cook, Timothy. "The Institutions-Incumbents Gap: A Reassessment of Institutional Support and Approval for Members of Institutions in American Government" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Southern Political Science Association, Inter-Continental Hotel, New Orleans, LA, Jan 06, 2005 <Not Available>. 2019-03-24 <>
Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: In this paper, we reevaluate the claim of a “gap” between support for institutions and support
for members, forwarded more forcefully by Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (1995). Here we show
that the institutions / members gap is historically contingent. In 2002, six months after the
terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center, and after an historic rally in public acclaim for
social and political institutions, we far a far smaller gap. The constellation of public opinion
toward institutions, then, seems to be more responsive to public events than some previous
theories have found.

2008 - APSA 2008 Annual Meeting Pages: 36 pages || Words: 9963 words || 
4. Fuller, Douglas. "Importing Institutions to Enhance Performance: How Foreign Financial Institutions Ameliorate Institutional Deficiencies in China’s Political Economy" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the APSA 2008 Annual Meeting, Hynes Convention Center, Boston, Massachusetts, Aug 28, 2008 Online <APPLICATION/DOWNLOAD>. 2019-03-24 <>
Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: This paper argues that there has been a common assumption in the field of comparative political economy that the key institutions of a given domestic political economy are relatively mutually reinforcing and tightly interconnected with at best some small friction in the interaction between the key parts. Mutually reinforcing and tightly interconnected institutions are ones with institutional complementarities where the arrangements in one institutional domain impact the difference in utility in another institutional domain. This paper dubs this assumption the holistic view of comparative political economy. Within the holistic view, interaction with foreign institutions can only lead to two outcomes. In the robust outcome, foreign institutions have little effect on the operation of domestic institutions. In the fragile outcome, the intrusion of foreign institutions disrupts the delicate balance of institutions within the domestic political economy with grave consequences for the economy.
Arguing against the assumption that the holistic view is correct, the paper provides evidence of successful use of importing foreign institutions in China. Importing institutions is utilizing the institutional effects of institutions located abroad. It is not imitation or transfer of foreign institutions to be re-built within the domestic political economy. In the case of China, the financial institutions of advanced capitalism have encouraged technological development that China’s own financial institutions failed to provide. Thus, this importation of foreign institutions far from being disruptive has had an ameliorative effect on China’s economy and calls into question the basic assumption of the holistic view.

2004 - The Midwest Political Science Association Words: 549 words || 
5. Bartels, Brandon., Smidt, Corwin. and McGraw, Kathleen. "Information and Institutional Evaluation: A Cross-Institutional Analysis" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the The Midwest Political Science Association, Palmer House Hilton, Chicago, Illinois, Apr 15, 2004 <Not Available>. 2019-03-24 <>
Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: In this paper, we examine the
extent to which exposure to context-specific information, in both
congressional and Supreme Court decision settings, influences people’s
institutional evaluation judgments. Although there is a considerable
amount research on institutional evaluation of the Supreme Court and
Congress separately, very little work has been done directly comparing
the dynamics of opinion formation for the two. In fact, two lines of
research on Congress and the Court, respectively, provide two competing
empirical implications of the role of information on institutional
evaluation. First, Hibbing and Theiss-Morse’s (1995, 2002) work on
congressional evaluations produces the implication that the more people
are exposed to the processes of Congress, the more likely they will be
exposed to the “sausage” that is the policymaking process, which then
leads to a greater likelihood of negative evaluations. On the other
hand, research on the Supreme Court (e.g., Casey 1974; Caldeira and
Gibson 1992; Gibson et al. 1998) has produced evidence supporting the
contention, to know the Court is to love it. That is, to “know” the
Court is to be exposed to the legitimating symbols by which the Court
is surrounded, which in turn leads to more positive evaluations. Thus,
regarding the role of information, two competing models of evaluation
exist: (1) To know Congress is to hate it, and (2) to know the Supreme
Court is to love it. This paper confronts these two competing models of
evaluation with an explicit cross-institutional focus in an attempt to
provide a unified account of the impact of information on institutional
evaluation. First, we posit a model explaining the processes by which
citizens translate information they consume from an institutional
decision-making context into an institutional evaluation judgment. In
particular, we argue that the information they receive about the
decision setting is pivotal in generating a perception-expectations gap
(via Kimball and Patterson 1997), which then exhibits a direct
influence on one’s evaluation judgments. We account for moderators of
this process such as issue importance and sophistication. We test the
implications of the model using a cross-institutional experimental
design that manipulates three types of information about an
institutional decision setting: (1) partisanship or ideological
division, (2) procedural fairness, and (3) civility. Importantly, our
design uses the institution (the Supreme Court or Congress) as a fourth
factor in order to test for interaction effects regarding the
comparative impact of information on evaluations for each institution.
For response variables, we measure subjects’ attitudes on various
facets of institutional evaluation for Congress or the Court, including
diffuse support, general approval, support for the decision itself,
compliance, and stealth democracy. We will then test for both the
direct effects of the manipulations on these various responses as well
as the extent to which the expectation-perception gap mediates the
impact of context-specific information on the different facets of
evaluation. With our explicit cross-institutional focus, we hope to
provide a unified account of the extent to which exposure to
information influences institutional evaluation judgments. Our model
and research design will help to clarify the relationship between
information and institutional evaluation across Congress and the Court,
which remains somewhat of a puzzle in the literature.
REFERENCES (cited in this proposal)
Caldeira, Gregory A., and James L. Gibson. 1992. The Etiology of Public
Support for the Supreme Court. American Journal of Political Science
Casey, Gregory. 1974. The Supreme Court and Myth: An Empirical
Investigation. Law & Society Review 8:385-419.
Gibson, James L., Gregory A. Caldeira, and Vanessa A. Baird. 1998. On
the Legitimacy of National High Courts. American Political Science
Review 92:343-58.
Hibbing, John R., and Elizabeth Theiss-Morse. 1995. Congress as Public
Enemy. Cambridge University Press.
Hibbing, John R., and Elizabeth Theiss-Morse. 2002. Stealth Democracy.
Cambridge University Press.

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