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2004 - The Law and Society Association Words: 95 words || 
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1. Van Hoy, Jerry. "Can We Generalize About Plaintiffs' Personal Injury Lawyers?" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the The Law and Society Association, Renaissance Hotel, Chicago, Illinois, May 27, 2004 <Not Available>. 2020-02-22 <http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p116750_index.html>
Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: My paper will examine the existing literaure on the work of plaintiffs' personal injury lawyers in an attempt to find commonalities among these attorneys despite different specializations and local regulations. Plaintiffs' attorneys are said to be a diverse and unique group. Thus, many scholars have asked if plaintiffs' lawyers in different states or different specializations are comparable. My paper will try to develop an analysis of the common practices of plaintiffs' attorneys to better inform this debate. I will then compare my findings about plaintiffs' attorneys in Indiana with the findings in the existing literature.

2009 - The Law and Society Association Words: 236 words || 
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2. Hyman, David., Black, Bernard. and Silver, Charles. "Waiting for the Big One: The Economics of Plaintiff-Side Personal Injury Litigation" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the The Law and Society Association, Grand Hyatt, Denver, Colorado, May 25, 2009 <Not Available>. 2020-02-22 <http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p305103_index.html>
Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: We obtained data on payouts, fees, and expenses for all cases settled over an extended period by two plaintiff-side personal injury firms, one in Texas, one in Illinois. We use this dataset (totaling roughly 3,700 cases) to study the economics of plaintiff-side personal injury litigation, and to estimate the effects of state fee caps.
Fees vary substantially, but the modal fee is one-third of the recovery. In prior work, we found that defense-side fees and expenses increased over time. Although plaintiff-side expenses increased over time, fees decreased at both firms as a percentage of recoveries.
Our data does not support claims of tacit collusion among plaintiffs' counsel on a standard 1/3 contingency fee, although a bare majority of cases are resolved with a fee at that level. A 1/3 fee is not uniformly collected ex post, even when the fee agreement calls for a 1/3 fee.
At the two firms, most of their income comes from a very small number of cases. Smaller cases may help to keep the lights on, but the big cases are what keep plaintiffs’ counsel in this line of work.
State statutory restrictions on attorneys’ fees vary in severity, but several may significantly change the economics of plaintiff-side representation. Holding case mix constant, we estimate that existing fee caps reduce aggregate fees by as little as 0% (Tennessee and Utah), and as much as 25% (California).

2017 - APSA Annual Meeting & Exhibition Pages: unavailable || Words: 12738 words || 
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3. Ryu, Jeheung. and Stone, Randall. "Plaintiffs by Proxy: A Firm-Level Approach to WTO Dispute Resolution" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the APSA Annual Meeting & Exhibition, TBA, San Francisco, CA, Aug 31, 2017 <Not Available>. 2020-02-22 <http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p1256480_index.html>
Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: Studies of disputes in the World Trade Organization typically assume that the disputants are the states that have the legal rights as members of the organization to bring suit and to be sued. We argue that in most cases, the real parties to the disputes are multinational business firms, which use states as proxies to pursue their claims. Firms lobby their governments (and sometimes foreign governments) to initiate disputes, and firms lobby the government of the defendant state and the complainant to defend policies that benefit them. In many cases involving the United States, firms lobby the U.S. government on both sides of a dispute. This change of perspective helps to explain why WTO disputes are so small. Received theory explains dispute resolution as a response to opportunism by governments and an efficient way to neutralize the terms-of-trade effects of trade-diverting policies. Cooperation requires mutual restraint, so there must be a punishment mechanism; but uncertainty could cause inefficient cycles of mutual retaliation. A dispute resolution mechanism avoids these problems by announcing when punishment is justified and when it is not, allowing the parties to coordinate their policies in spite of uncertainty (Keohane 1984). More recent work argues that the incentive to externalize trade adjustment comes from terms-of-trade effects, and the dispute resolution procedure neutralizes that incentive
because trade retaliation is authorized that affects comparable quantities of exports
(Bagwell and Staiger 2002). Both of these explanations suggest that it is puzzling that the
stakes in WTO disputes are typically measured in millions of dollars, rather than in tens
of billions. In the only case in which the WTO went so far as to authorize the imposition of
trade sanctions—Brazil’s complaint against the United States over cotton subsidies—the
sanctions authorized were well under $1 billion. Disputes of this magnitude are not sufficient disincentive to prevent opportunism on politically salient issues (or even, as it turned out, on the issue of cotton subsidies), and they are not economically important enough to shift the terms of trade in any meaningful sense. Nevertheless, small-scale WTO disputes have proliferated since 1995, and the outcomes have been very important to one type of actor: multinational firms.

We match Fortune 500 firms to disputes in which they have a publicly announced stake, and demonstrate that firm lobbying expenditures increase significantly when a WTO dispute engages a firm’s interests. We use two original sources to collect the list of firms involved in WTO disputes: official WTO dispute settlement documentation and newspaper articles. We use an automated content analysis to extract the list of firm names using Python. To analyze the effect of firm activities on trade disputes, we gather lobbying expenditure data in the U.S. as an index of power. While we cannot directly observe lobbying activities or the details of what lobbying firms sought, we treat firms’ annual lobbying expenditures as a measure of their lobbying effort and political influence. The empirical results we present provide consistent evidence of firms’ political activity. Fortune Global 500 firms allocate more resources to lobbying when they are involved in WTO trade disputes. In the United States, firms have access to the government and can use the Section 301 process to request that the U.S. Trade Representative investigate their concerns and possibly file a case in the WTO. The existence of this formal institutional mechanism, however, does not necessarily guarantee that domestic exporting firms can motivate policymakers to act on their concerns. In addition, preparation for an official WTO adjudication is costly for firms. They have to first identify foreign policies that are WTO-inconsistent, and then estimate the economic benefits of removing such policies. We further find that lobbying expenditures by firms that support the defendant’s position lead to longer disputes. The complainant’s priority is to remove WTO-inconsistent policies and open up the exporting market, whereas defendants prefer to maintain the status quo and drag out the litigation process. However, from a bargaining perspective the investment in a lengthy dispute may be worthwhile even for the plaintiff. Bargaining is a contest in which time is wasted in order to demonstrate resolve. If lobbying increases the home government’s audience costs from making concessions, it should extend the bargaining process on average, but also lead to a more favorable negotiated settlement.

2006 - The Law and Society Association Words: 78 words || 
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4. Nagareda, Richard. "Mass Torts in a World of Settlement: Government as Plaintiff" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the The Law and Society Association, Jul 06, 2006 <Not Available>. 2020-02-22 <http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p95237_index.html>
Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: This paper consists of a chapter from my forthcoming book entitled “Mass Torts in a World of Settlement.” Specifically, my Chapter 10 (one of 12 chapters in the book) is entitled “Government as Plaintiff” and addresses the phenomenon of litigation by governmental bodies to obtain reimbursement for the additional increment of expenditures from the public fisc said to arise from mass tortious misconduct – e.g., the fraudulent sale of tobacco products or the negligent marketing of firearms.

2009 - The Law and Society Association Words: 249 words || 
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5. Berrey, Ellen., Steve, Hoffman. and Nielsen, Laura Beth. "Workplace Discrimination Litigation, Procedural Justice, and Plaintiffs’ Construction of Fairness" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the The Law and Society Association, Grand Hyatt, Denver, Colorado, May 25, 2009 <Not Available>. 2020-02-22 <http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p304081_index.html>
Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: This paper examines how plaintiffs perceive the fairness of the legal process of employment discrimination litigation and the outcomes of such litigation. The paper draws on interviews with 41 randomly selected plaintiffs who filed employment discrimination cases in U.S. federal court between 1988 and 2003. The paper identifies and describes the specific factors that plaintiffs consider most relevant when assessing the fairness of their cases. These factors include plaintiffs’ perceptions of favoritism in the legal system, the opportunity to tell their story and to have an authority figure fully consider their case, their perceptions of their lawyers’ skills and integrity, and the perceived bases upon which judges and juries seem to make decisions. Plaintiffs’ satisfaction with their case outcomes varies depending upon the case’s consequences for their careers, their personal health and happiness, and the employers as well as the award and any broader legal impacts of their cases. The paper engages the procedural justice literature by examining how people construct the meaning of fairness in real legal cases and in the specific context of employment civil rights. Our study provides greater granularity and nuance to the measures used in studies of procedural justice. Our findings also challenge research results that show that as long as plaintiffs feel they have been treated fairly, then the outcomes of their cases do not matter for their future legal engagement. We find that most plaintiffs feel strongly that they have not been treated fairly yet they would pursue the same lawsuit again.

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