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2004 - International Studies Association Words: 516 words || 
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1. Liu, Xinmin. "Presidentialism and Party Aggregation: A Cross-national Examination of Presidential Elections and Presidential Legisaltive Powers on the Number of Parties" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Le Centre Sheraton Hotel, Montreal, Quebec, Canada, Mar 17, 2004 <Not Available>. 2019-06-16 <http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p73985_index.html>
Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: With the resurgence of democratization in Latin America, Eastern Europe, and elsewhere since late 1970s, how to craft institutions to sustain democracy has been a primary concern for politicians and scholars (Di Palma 1990; Diamond 1997; Diamond and Gunther 2001; Lijphart and Waisman 1996; Mainwaring and Scully 1995). One of the keen topics is about regime type (parliamentary vs. presidential systems) and democratic continuity. While much of the scholarship blames presidentialism for policy-making gridlocks in the separation-of-power systems, which usually lead to political crises and instabilities in transforming societies (Burns 1963; Cox and Kernell 1991; Edwards et. al 1997; Shugart 1995; Sundquist 1986, 1992; Valenzuela and Linz 1994), some scholars link presidentialism with fragmented party systems, a main cause of democratic breakdowns (Mainwaring 1992-1993). That is, presidentialism's conduciveness to fragmented party systems makes the separation-of-power system more vulnerable than parliamentary systems to political crises in case of policy-making deadlocks. Much of the empirical scholarship of presidentialism and party systems, however, has concentrated on the impact of presidential elections on the number of parties. Basically, presidentialism is thought to help aggregate political parties because of the coattail effects of nationwide presidential campaigns and elections on legislative elections (Miller 1955; Press 1958). More recently, proximity (concurrence) between presidential and legislative elections is found to enhance the coattail effect of presidential elections and thus promote big parties (Cox 1997; Neto and Cox 1997; Mainwaring 1990, 1991, and 1992-1993; Shugart and Carey 1992). Also, plurality presidential election formulas are found to better serve the big parties than majority run-off rules (Jones 1994; Mainwaring and Shugart 1997). However, little empirical analysis has examined the relationship between presidential legislative powers and party systems although evidence has identified the political problems in the legislative processes in the separation-of-power systems. Moreover, case selection in conventional empirical studies is basically limited to advanced democracies and some Latin American countries. This paper thus tries to empirically analyze the relationship between presidentialism and party aggregation more systematically and with a focus on presidential power and party aggregation. First, including all democracies, the systems that have a positive Polity score (Gurr and Jagger 1998; Marshall 2002), in this analysis, this paper will re-evaluate the impact of regime type on the number of parties. Second, including all the presidential systems in both old and emerging democracies, this paper will re-test the relationship between presidential elections and the number of parties. Third and most important, this paper will empirically examine the consequences of presidential legislative powers for party systems, not only analyzing the relationship between levels of presidential legislative power and party aggregation but also providing an in-depth inspection of the impact of specific presidential powers including veto, partial veto, exclusive legislation, budgetary power, decree power, and referenda power on party aggregation. It begins by reviewing theoretical and empirical literature on presidentialism and the number of political parties. Next, it discusses the dataset, research design, and operationalization of variables, including measurement of presidential legislative powers. Last, it presents and analyzes regression results.

2002 - American Political Science Association Pages: 18 pages || Words: 4001 words || 
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2. Kaplan, Noah. and Park, David. "Presidential Coattails: The Effects of Presidential Campaign Advertising on Presidential and Congressional Elections" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston Marriott Copley Place, Sheraton Boston & Hynes Convention Center, Boston, Massachusetts, Aug 28, 2002 <Not Available>. 2019-06-16 <http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p66189_index.html>
Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: We argue that both presidential elections and house elections are a function of presidential campaign television advertising. Whereas the former may appear obvious, we contend that a Zalleresque theory/model of opinion formation suggests that presidential campaign advertising can effect the number and content of considerations associated with the major party labels, considerations which voters then sample when assessing house candidates. Using a relatively new dataset regarding the number of presidential television advertisements aired by Designated Market Area (DMA) during the 1996 presidential campaign, we present an aggregate level analysis of the effects of presidential campaign television advertising on presidential and house vote share. We find that ads do not effect vote share as predicted once we control for state level effects. We discuss possible reasons for these null results and future avenues of research.

2006 - American Political Science Association Pages: 27 pages || Words: 11581 words || 
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3. Hicken, Allen. and Stoll, Heather. "Presidential Powers and Presidential Candidates: How Political Institutions Shape Electoral Coordination in Presidential Elections" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Marriott, Loews Philadelphia, and the Pennsylvania Convention Center, Philadelphia, PA, Aug 31, 2006 <Not Available>. 2019-06-16 <http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p152688_index.html>
Publication Type: Proceeding
Abstract: In this paper, we explore which political institutions, besides the electoral formula, shape the presidential party system. We find that the relationship between horizontal centralization, operationalized as the powers of the president, and the presidential party system, operationalized as the effective number of presidential candidates, is significant but non-linear. Specifically, over a moderate range of presidential power, increasing presidential power is associated with fewer presidential candidates. Where presidents are extremely weak or extremely powerful, however, this relationship is reversed: in these circumstances, increasing presidential power actually produces a larger number of candidates. We further demonstrate that the substantive effect of horizontal centralization on the effective number of candidates is more than twice as large as the effect of the electoral formula—heretofore the most discussed determinant of the effective number of presidential candidates. Our findings with respect to vertical centralization are mixed.

2009 - Southern Political Science Association Pages: 1 pages || Words: 320 words || 
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4. Lindskog, Gregg. "Dueling Presidential Narratives: Presidential Signaling Strategies in the Clinton and Bush Administrations" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Southern Political Science Association, Hotel Intercontinental, New Orleans, LA, Jan 07, 2009 Online <PDF>. 2019-06-16 <http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p285673_index.html>
Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: Previous work has shown a President’s capacity to shape public policy through articulating political narratives (goals and values under a connected label) in domestic policy [Neustadt (1964)] and in foreign policy [Bose (1998)].

Recently released accounts of the Bush administration allow us, for the first time, to analyze the impact of his narrative.

This paper, a part of a larger project, compares the administrations of Bill Clinton and George W. Bush in the uses of presidential narratives to signal and shape administration policy. I argue that these presidents use two distinct narrative types. President Bush adopted a “bounded” narrative (The War on Terror) which has a clearly laid out logic and is proactive in intent, while his predecessor adopted an “unbounded” narrative (The Third Way and Middle class entitlement) which is malleable in logic and reactive in intent.

I argue that President Bush’s bounded narrative strategy allowed him to impose a political context on administrative decision-making and to operate from a position of strength. However, Bush’s strategy limited his flexibility in presidential decision-making and allowed administration officials to use the narrative to influence their own power stakes. It also tied President Bush to potentially unpopular political positions. Conversely, President Clinton’s unbounded narrative strategy, a comparatively weaker leadership position, allowed him more flexibility in constructing administration policy and greater capacity for blame avoidance. I conclude that these two divergent strategies each have strengths and weaknesses but that president’s might do a better job of fitting their strategy to the political climate.

2008 - Northeastern Political Science Association Words: 451 words || 
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5. Korzi, Michael. "Presidential Signing Statements: Constitutional Negotiation or Presidential Overreach?" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Northeastern Political Science Association, Omni Parker House, Boston, MA, Nov 13, 2008 <Not Available>. 2019-06-16 <http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p275874_index.html>
Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: This paper looks at signing statements in the administration of George W. Bush. While not a full-blown defense of Bush’s signing statements, the paper takes seriously the rationale for signing statements and seeks to locate them in a proper theoretical context. The paper not only sheds critical light on the nature of modern legislating as a key culprit in the proliferation of signing statements, but also looks at some potential benefits to signing statements.

First, the paper examines an obvious but neglected aspect of the debate, viz., that presidential signing statements are at least that, statements. In other words, signing statements are transparent: presidents are promulgating their opinions, not working behind the scenes to push policy preferences. Second, and more substantively, we might ask: Why shouldn’t presidents' opinions about why they signed or supported legislation hold some weight when considering how to understand the legislation? Congress routinely crafts ambiguous legislation precisely so members can read into it what they want thereby assuring majority support. If a president reads a bill in a particular way when he or she signs it, why is that interpretation necessarily illegitimate? In fact, couldn't this be seen as an expression of presidential dialogue in the process of governing, a kind of negotiation between “separate institutions sharing power”?

Third, one needs to consider the alternatives to signing statements, each bringing substantial drawbacks. Presidents might veto bills in which there are offending clauses until Congress amends the bills accordingly. But the realities of modern lawmaking (and expectations of presidents) often mandate against this course. Presidents might sign bills and then take their problems to the federal courts. Yet, since many of the provisions in Congress’ bills will not make it to the federal courts for quite some time (and maybe never to the Supreme Court), Congress is relatively unfettered in its ability to make unconstitutional laws, especially as regards restrictions of presidential authority. Perhaps most problematic, presidents might simply sign pieces of legislation and then work surreptitiously through the implementation process to undermine the legislation. Given these options, signing statements may hold some utility within the constitutional order.

The paper concludes with a caveat. Although Bush’s signing statements appear less worrisome than often thought, they should be carefully watched. As John Locke pointed out in his Second Treatise of Government, executive actions become illegitimate when "mistake or flattery prevailed with weak princes to make use of . . . power for private ends of their own, and not for the public good." That this does not seem to be the case with Bush’s signing statements does not relieve the public of due vigilance.

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