Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished ManuscriptAbstract: Glassware and rubber footwear are both beneficiaries of special protections under U.S. trade
policy, yet the incidence of non-tariff barriers (NTBs) on rubber footwear is considerably greater.
Theories explaining trade policy and domestic politics routinely emphasize interactions between political
actors including executives, legislators, voters and interest groups. The interactions between
varying combinations of such actors largely determine the extent to which a state will engage in
free trade or protectionist policies. However, there is considerable variation in the specific policies
governing protected commodities, and much less is known about how trade policy is developed for
specific goods. Since different instruments generate different incentive structures to rent seek
and hence have differential implications for social costs, more theory is needed that explains the
form of specific trade policy. Just as some states emphasize free trade over protectionism (and vice
versa), special protections policies can be more or less complex. Here we will argue that the specific
form of these protections policy is due largely to the nature of the enacting legislative coalition and
its relationship with relevant interest groups. Though tariffs are generally the easiest−and most
transparent−form of protection policy to implement, the level of complexity will increase as interest
groups wield greater power over the policy-making process. These more complex policies are
attractive to politicians because they are less likely to be implicated as sources of increased social
costs while appealing to commodity lobbies because it is more difficult to overturn complex policies
than simple policies. Legislators design more complex policy in order to lock in the protections
awarded to a particular commodity and secure the support of the relevant interest group. Consequently,
more complex protections policies are a testament to the strength of interest groups. On
the other hand, imposing tariffs is simpler, more transparent, and from a transaction costs perspective,
less costly than non-tariff barriers such as subsidies and quotas. The task of this paper is to
understand what conditions influence the level of policy complexity.
Publication Type: Individual PaperReview Method: Peer ReviewedAbstract: Focusing on the women of color detained under “failure to protect” laws in the US, I point toward the institutionalized violence embedded in the settler logics of protection. Drawing from Gloria Anzaldúa’s notion of intimate terrorism and physical and metaphorical borders, I explore how the white, heteropatriarchal family centers the violent logic of protecting the state against non-domestic and domestic deviance. Adding to Angela Davis’s urgent call that we recognize the “secret prisons” within our own borders, I outline a decolonial feminist approach to thinking about the not-so-secret prisoners who failed to protect.
Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished ManuscriptAbstract: A large literature documents to what extent a state will engage in free trade or protectionist policies. However, there is considerable variation in the specific policies governing protected commodities, and much less is known about how trade policy is developed for specific goods. Since different instruments generate different incentive structures _x000d_to “rent seek” and hence have differential implications for social costs, more theory is needed that explains the form of specific trade policy. Here we will argue that the specific form of these protections policy is due largely to the nature _x000d_of the enacting legislative coalition and its relationship with relevant interest groups. In contrast to existing theories of trade policy, we argue that the commitment problems that plague the interactions between legislators and interest groups are central to understanding why some _x000d_protections are more complex than others. After developing a theory of the specific form of protections policy, we test it using a simple multilevel model and TRAINS data for the U.S. _x000d_during the 1990s.
Publication Type: Panel PaperAbstract: In 2010, the Global Coalition to Protect Education from Attack was established, institutionalizing advocacy on the need to safeguard schools, students, and teachers in areas of armed conflict. In its initial years of its existence, what impact did the protecting education movement have in the settings where it was actually intended to make a difference? Few studies have examined the initial stages of global issue emergence as they occur--and the constraints they face in attempting have an impact on the ground. Drawing on fieldwork conducted from September 2012 to July 2013, in Palestine, and New York, I examine the range of individuals involved in protecting education and assess the institutional structures that limit their ability to make a real difference. I argue that the individuals who are most able to take advantage of a global advocacy movement for particular purposes are those who have a strong knowledge both of international frameworks, as well as of the specific context in which they work. However, the international humanitarian system has a tendency to bifurcate these two sets of knowledge. Indeed, its staffing structure divides employees into international are local categories and privileges knowledge of international norms and frameworks over contextual knowledge. This division is both inaccurate--most individuals do not neatly fit into these categories--and also obstructs the “on the ground” impact of a global advocacy movement by disadvantaging those individuals who have both sets of knowledge.
Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished ManuscriptAbstract: The principles underpinning the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and Protection of Civilians (POC) are inextricably linked. Indeed R2P â as captured in the 2005 World Summit outcomes document and reaffirmed in Security Council Resolution 1674 (2006) â shou