Guest  

 
Search: 
Search By: SubjectAbstractAuthorTitleFull-Text

 

Showing 1 through 5 of 2,840 records.
Pages: Previous - 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 ... 568 - Next  Jump:
2011 - SASE Annual Conference Pages: 13 pages || Words: 6312 words || 
Info
1. Zimmerman, Kenneth. "Economic Regulators for an Anti-Regulation Era: Constructing the Regulator for Hostile Territory" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the SASE Annual Conference, Autonomous University of Madrid, Spain, Madrid, Spain, Jun 23, 2011 Online <APPLICATION/PDF>. 2019-09-23 <http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p498345_index.html>
Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: The “in the wild” work of neo-liberal economists and their supporters was successful in embedding into economies around the world the twin notions of markets as the source of all services and products thereby negating the need for government. But neo-liberal economics provided more than principles and theories. It also provided a structure of rules and laws, organizational prescriptions, and tools and procedures for building a functioning and functional market economy. All of these became the basis for economies around the world, and particularly in the United States (US) and the United Kingdom (UK). In the neo-liberal actor-world markets are not only the most effective way for arranging economic transactions but also the only morally correct way. In this regard neo-liberalism economies are absolutist, elitist, dogmatic, and vituperative regarding the place of markets in economic life and the treatment of enemies of this stance. And this brings us to regulation. In particular we come to economic regulation; the regulation of the actual price of a commodity or of the process for arriving at that price. Neo-liberal economists and their supporters and with them the economies whose form they played a large role in arranging assert that no regulation or outside monitoring of markets is necessary because they are self correcting. In fact, they contend that “correct” market actions are actually harmed by attempted government regulation. As a result in these economies economic regulation has been scaled back noticeably or wholly eliminated to the extent possible. These economies also display an active dislike for and hostility toward economic regulators and economic regulation. But now these economies are faced with the economic events of 2007 and thereafter and the associated “great recession.” In democratic countries there is widespread outcry for stronger economic regulations and tougher and smarter economic regulators. Even in China and Russia this pressure in being expressed and felt. In this paper I examine the responses to this pressure in the US. My particular focus is on the construction of regulators and how they are going about or plan to go about their regulatory duties. In answering this question I examine three regulators and their actions.
1. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission regulator (FERC).
2. The Commodities Futures Trading Commission regulator (CFTC).
3. The Securities Exchange Commission regulator (SEC).

2014 - SASE Annual Conference Pages: unavailable || Words: 11490 words || 
Info
2. Jonnergård, Karin. "Regulating Auditing - From Regulating of (and by) a Profession to Regulating a Product" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the SASE Annual Conference, Northwestern University and the University of Chicago, Chicago, IL USA, Jul 10, 2014 Online <APPLICATION/PDF>. 2019-09-23 <http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p731916_index.html>
Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: Regulation of auditing has historically been built on the conception of the auditor as a profession. In practical terms, this has led to regulation of the auditor as a professional, as well as a certain amount of self-regulation from the professional associations. In for example early Swedish legal texts on auditing, the personality and the reputation of the individual auditor are important basis, for both the accreditation of auditor and the trust of auditing as a governance mechanism. This is in tune with the perception of professional judgement as an important feature of professional work and a reason for professional discretion and autonomy. In this paper it is claimed that historically the idea of auditing as a professional work has been well institutionalized by both regulatory agencies and the auditors themselves through the processes and outcome of audit regulation in Sweden. However, more recently the audit has taken more and more the feature of a commodity (Suddaby & Greenwood 2001). The process of commodification has occurred by internalizing knowledge in organizational systems, procedures and commodities (Abbott 1991) implying that the ‘expertise in people’ lost in relevance. In practice this implies an emphasis on standards and procedure for auditing, rather than individual judgements or the morality of the auditor. This development is reinforced by the development of the audit industry as well as the standardization of the business society at large in the wake of the globalization.

In this paper we focus on the audit professions’ conception of auditing as a professional project or as a commodity in Sweden. We follow the discursive development of this conception between 1989 and 2011 through the writing in the professional association’s journal. Our aim is to (i) describe this development (ii) investigate into the relation between the changing conception and the regulatory processes (iii) analyse the relation between the conception of auditing and the claim for self-regulation. The objective is to reach a first understanding of how the self-understanding of different actors’ influence the regulatory conversation (Black 2001) in this area.

2009 - Midwest Political Science Association 67th Annual National Conference Words: 171 words || 
Info
3. Kay, William. and Eijmberts, eijmbert.jJohannes. "Regulating Emerging Technologies; What Regulators of Nanotechnology Today May Learn from The Regulation of Nuclear Fission since the 1950s." Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association 67th Annual National Conference, The Palmer House Hilton, Chicago, IL, <Not Available>. 2019-09-23 <http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p362616_index.html>
Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: Nanotechnology is an emerging technology holding great promises for the future by introducing nanoscale devices (smaller than 1-9th meter) for medical, computing, and manufacturing applications. Currently nanotechnology poses serious challenges to government regulators. After 1945, the American government moved to develop nuclear fission technology for civilian purposes. Congress established the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) to oversee the promotion and regulation of atomic power in the United States. In the following decades the AEC struggled to build new government capacity to fulfill its dual mandate while nuclear science kept advancing rapidly and the assessment of the risks associated with nuclear power continued to produce new insights - thus forcing the AEC to constantly adapt to new findings. The research presented is a case study drawing from the experiences of the AEC in building capacity to simultaneously promote and regulate an emerging technology, while technological progress is ongoing. The paper holds lessons of the AEC for government agencies involved in the promotion and regulation of nanotechnology today. Research supported by NSF award 0425826.

2014 - SASE Annual Conference Pages: unavailable || Words: 13361 words || 
Info
4. HARNAY, Sophie. "The Influence of the Economic Approaches to Regulation on Banking Regulations: A Short History of Banking Regulations" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the SASE Annual Conference, Northwestern University and the University of Chicago, Chicago, IL USA, Jul 10, 2014 Online <APPLICATION/PDF>. 2019-09-23 <http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p727824_index.html>
Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: Banking regulations have been at the core of political and economic debates since the outbreak of the current crisis. Consistent with the line initially defined by the Basel I Agreement, most of them dismiss all macro-prudential concerns and almost exclusively adopt a micro-prudential logic that has proved inefficient – or insufficient – to ensure financial stability in the recent years.
The purpose of the article is therefore to understand how the theoretical background underlying the micro-prudential orientation of banking regulations impacted on regulatory practices and how – at least partly – it may help understand the outbreak of the 2007-2008 financial crisis. The article discusses the body of theoretical and empirical knowledge framing the analysis of banking regulations and guiding them in most developed countries over the last decades, drawing a parallel between the main changes having occurred in banking regulations since the 1960’s on the one hand and the evolutions of the economic analyses of regulation over the same period on the other hand. It thus argues that the economic theories of regulation have contributed in a major way to the shaping of banking regulatory policies since the 1960’s and claims that the main evolutions in the field would never have occurred if academic micro-economists had not supported them through their research massively. In particular, we highlight the shift in thinking that takes place in the 1970’s and the explanations through which deregulatory evolutions are justified at that time. On this basis, we argue that the analytical shift from the public interest theory of regulation that prevailed until the late 1960s toward the private interest theory of regulation accounts for the substitution of macro-prudential regulations for micro-prudential ones, leading to a change in the conception of the duties of banking authorities and their instruments. We then claim that, albeit the outcome of a bunch of various factors, the 2007-2008 crises can also be explained as a consequence of the economic analysis of banking regulations having supported micro-prudential regulations and self-regulation that have failed to take into account the global features and impact of banking activities and have therefore proved unable to recommend efficient solutions in a crisis context.
The article is organized as follows. First, we study how the shift from the public interest theory of regulation inspired by welfare economics toward the private interest theory of regulation in the 1960’s and 1970’s impacted on banking regulations and provided an intellectual basis for the deregulation of the banking industry. Second, we show how the development of the economics of information and the new importance devoted to the notions of asymmetric information and incentives leads to a new paradigm in the economic analyses of regulation in the 1980’s, therefore impacting on the re-regulation process at work in the banking industry. Third, we suggest that the current debates on banking regulations following the 2007-2008 financial turmoil may be interpreted to some extent as a revival of the public interest regulation in the field of banking regulation.

Keywords: banking regulations, public interest theory of regulation, private interest theory of regulation

JEL Codes: B26, G28, K23

2005 - The Midwest Political Science Association Words: 34 words || 
Info
5. Rodine, Kirsten. "Regulating the Information Economy in the New Europe: Who Regulates the Regulators?" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the The Midwest Political Science Association, Palmer House Hilton, Chicago, Illinois, Apr 07, 2005 <Not Available>. 2019-09-23 <http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p86657_index.html>
Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: Why did European countries form two separate yet overlapping networks of independent telecommunications regulators? I argue that these networks constitute an importance compromise between governance on the European level and within member states.

Pages: Previous - 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 ... 568 - Next  Jump:

©2019 All Academic, Inc.   |   All Academic Privacy Policy