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2006 - The Midwest Political Science Association Words: 41 words || 
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1. Roberts, Jason. "Scoring the Senate: Parties, Scorecards, and Voting in the U.S. Senate" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the The Midwest Political Science Association, Palmer House Hilton, Chicago, Illinois, <Not Available>. 2018-08-18 <http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p137213_index.html>
Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: In this paper, we seek to understand how senators and negotiate the conflict between parties and interest groups on votes that groups choose to score. Our preliminary results suggest that many of the observed majority party rolls occur on votes th

2017 - 88th Annual SPSA Conference Words: 150 words || 
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2. Chaturvedi, Neilan., Benson, Evan., Davis, Thomas. and Smith, Gabriel. "When Committees Can Harm: Cross-Pressured Senators and Senate Committee Assignments" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the 88th Annual SPSA Conference, Hyatt Regency, New Orleans, LA, Jan 11, 2017 <Not Available>. 2018-08-18 <http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p1201939_index.html>
Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: Can committee work harm electoral prospects? Commenting on the importance of committees, Woodrow Wilson said, “Congress in session is Congress on public exhibition, whilst Congress in its Committee Rooms is Congress at work.” Indeed, as important as committees are to the legislative process, committee assignments hold just as much importance for senators. Mayhew (1978) argues that legislators can use committee assignments to bolster their chances at completing their goals of reelection, power, and good public policy. Do these strategies ever backfire? For example, Democrat Mary Landrieu’s prospects for reelection were initially bolstered by her appointment as chair of the Energy Committee, but her lackluster performance on the committee eventually harmed her campaign. In this paper, we examine committee assignments and their impact on reelection. We find that for the most part, senators are beneficiaries of their committee assignments except for cross-pressured senators, who are often caught between party and constituency.

2015 - Southern Political Science Association Pages: unavailable || Words: 12019 words || 
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3. Stockley, Joshua. "The Futility of the Deep South Democrat? The 2014 Louisiana Senate Election: Senator Mary Landrieu versus Rep. Bill Cassidy" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Southern Political Science Association, Hyatt Regency, New Orleans, Louisiana, Jan 15, 2015 Online <APPLICATION/PDF>. 2018-08-18 <http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p949921_index.html>
Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: Democratic success in the Deep South is mostly limited to district-level races protected by the Voting Rights Act; however, state-level races, where white voters constitute majorities, have proven much more elusive. Louisiana remains distinct in this regard, being the only Deep South state with a Democratic Senator and arriving later than its brethren to the Republican fold. In a state wracked by natural and political disasters, incumbent Mary Landrieu (D) faces a tough battle to win a fourth term to the U.S. Senate against U.S. Representative Bill Cassidy (R) in a state clearly dominated by Republicans. This paper analyses the partisan shift in Louisiana in the context of the 2014 Senate election and offers insights for the future of the Democratic Party in Louisiana and elsewhere in the South.

2006 - American Political Science Association Pages: 41 pages || Words: 12203 words || 
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4. Grose, Christian. "Valence Advantages and Ideological Shirking in the U.S. Senate: Why Do Senators Take Positions That Are Different From Their Constituents' Preferences?" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Marriott, Loews Philadelphia, and the Pennsylvania Convention Center, Philadelphia, PA, Aug 31, 2006 <Not Available>. 2018-08-18 <http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p151774_index.html>
Publication Type: Proceeding
Abstract: Do non-policy valence advantages that incumbent members of Congress possess affect spatial position-taking? Are legislators who deliver substantial amounts of federal largesse more likely to diverge from their constituency medians? Are legislators who are perceived as more competent than their opponents more likely to diverge from the preferences of their constituents? I argue and empirically demonstrate that valence advantages such as the distribution of “pork” projects and legislator competence allow incumbent legislators to deviate from the policy preferences of their constituents (in some instances). Formal valence theories of position-taking are examined in this paper, and I argue for an expansive definition of valence advantages that includes both valence policies and non-policy valence characteristics. I show that valence advantages sometimes cause legislators to converge to their constituents’ preferences and to sometimes diverge. I test the expectations of valence theories of congressional position-taking by examining an example of a valence issue (distributive policy) and a valence characteristic (an incumbent’s perceived competence relative to his or her challenger). These empirical tests are conducted with original data on senators’ divergence from their states’ median voters during the 104th-107th Congresses (1995-2002). One key contribution of this paper is the creation of ideal point estimates of legislators and constituency medians on a common scale using Bayesian MCMC ideal point estimation techniques (similar to the popular NOMINATE scores, though unlike NOMINATE, these scores include measures of constituents and senators). The findings are that valence theories of position-taking are demonstrated when examining incumbent divergence from the constituency median. In sum, senators with no valence advantage diverge from their constituents; senators with small valence advantages move closer to their constituents; and senators with large valence advantages are able to deviate far off of their constituents’ preferences. The implications of these results are that senators who deliver very large amounts of federal outlays to a state or senators perceived as very competent relative to their campaign challengers are able to vote closer to their own personal preferences than to their constituents’ preferences.

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