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2005 - International Studies Association Pages: 1 pages || Words: 381 words || 
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1. Yarhi, Keren. and Petti, William. "The Renaissance of Signaling in Security Studies: Examining the Issues of Multiple Audiences, Signaling Legacies, and Signal Interaction" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Hilton Hawaiian Village, Honolulu, Hawaii, Mar 05, 2005 <Not Available>. 2019-11-14 <http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p71357_index.html>
Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: Recently, scholars in IR have returned to the subject of interstate communication, specifically the notion of signaling. States use signals to convey specific information about themselves to other states. These signals are typically intended to convince the target (or receiver) that the state is the type of actor that it claims to be (e.g. the type that is capable and willing to launch a preemptive war, committed to free-trade, a dependable ally, etc.). Conversely, states try to determine what type of actors others are. This is typically done by interpreting the actions of other states and determining whether they reveal something dispositional about that state (i.e. an attribute that is difficult to manipulate) or whether it is merely a ploy by the state to bluff its way through. Despite the recent renaissance in the study of signaling in the literature a number of theoretical gaps and omissions remain. More specifically, the literature often ignores the fact then when states send signals: a) their message is heard by multiple audiences; b) interaction with signals sent from other states may generate feedback loops; and c) they create signaling legacies that lock states into specific policies, complicating diplomacy and bargaining. This paper will evaluate the existing literature about signaling and offer a new signaling framework that utilizes a two-level game approach informed by insights from both realism and constructivism. To illustrate the utility of the framework the paper presents two empirical case studies. First, it examines the extent to which the interaction between Israel's doctrine of nuclear opacity and Syria's doctrine of strategic parity prevented a political settlement of the territorial dispute over the Golan Heights. Second, it evaluates the German state's need to send seemingly conflicting signals of antimilitarism and multilateralism-to its domestic and international audiences, respectively-and how that shaped Germany's role in the 1999 NATO-led bombing campaign against Serbia.

2018 - American Sociological Association Annual Meeting Pages: unavailable || Words: 11304 words || 
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2. Van Ness, Justin. "Signal Transmission, Signal Reception: Drawing on Goffman and the Dual Process Framework to Theorize Protest Events" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Sociological Association Annual Meeting, Pennsylvania Convention Center & Philadelphia Marriott, Philadelphia, PA, Aug 09, 2018 Online <APPLICATION/PDF>. 2019-11-14 <http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p1380238_index.html>
Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: Integrating cognitive social science research on dual process models with microsociological theories of interaction, I develop a heuristic to typologize communication pathways in protest events. The model accounts for both controlled and automatic signal transmission, and deliberate “Type II” and associative “Type I” cognition structuring signal reception. Empirically, I use this heuristic to analyze interactions during protest situations. I argue that the overemphasis on controlled signals and deliberate cognition, particularly from framing literature, has overlooked how automatic signals and associative cognition influence interaction. I position existing collective behavior and social movement research to reveal the ways scholars have explicitly or implicitly privileged one communication pathway at the expense of others. Then, I draw from my in-depth ethnography to situate empirical findings within the heuristic. In closing, I argue minimizing or excluding one pathway from explanatory primacy is something which needs to be made explicitly, taking into consideration both analytic warrant and empirical adequacy.

2006 - XVth Biennial International Conference on Infant Studies Words: 405 words || 
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3. Donovan, Wilberta., Leavitt, Lewis. and Taylor, Nicole. "Manipulated Infant Gender Effects on Maternal Sensory Sensitivity to Infant Affective Signaling: Signal Detection Analysis" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the XVth Biennial International Conference on Infant Studies, Westin Miyako, Kyoto, Japan, Jun 19, 2006 <Not Available>. 2019-11-14 <http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p93748_index.html>
Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: Background and Aims: Signal detection methodology is applied to the study of mother-infant interaction in order to separate maternal sensory sensitivity to infant affective signals from response bias. For the infant, affective signals are the primary means of communication by which he or she engages the caregiver. The mother relies on changes in her infant’s facial and vocal expression to provide her with feedback as she attempts to regulate the infant’s affect. Gender related patterns in mother’s response to the infant’s affective displays have been reported. Using signal detection methodology, this study examined differences in mothers’ sensory sensitivity and response bias to infants’ positive and negative expressions as influenced by labeling the stimulus ‘male’ or ‘female.’

Methods: Sixty-nine mothers, each with a 6-month-old infant, participated in the signal detection task. This methodology measures sensory sensitivity independent of response bias which affects the decision-making process. The task assessed mothers' ability to differentiate between the standard of a given facial expression and one of six variants which differed slightly along a continuum of morphed pictures varying in affect intensity. Mothers were randomly assigned to receive either the male or female label. For each of the two stimulus sets (positive and negative expression), two measures were calculated: 1) sensory sensitivity–the ability to differentiate between the standard and a given variant and 2) response bias – a same/different response preference.

Key Results: A MANOVA yielded a gender manipulation effect on sensory sensitivity to the positive expression, p < .02, and a marginal effect on the negative expression, p < .09. Lower scores reflect greater sensitivity. Mothers who received the female manipulation were 1) more sensitive to the positive expression (M = 2.43) compared to mothers receiving the male manipulation (M = 3.10), and 2) more sensitivity to negative expression (M = 2.74) compared to those receiving the male manipulation (M = 3.04). Also, mothers who received the female manipulation had a response bias reflecting a tendency toward pressing the different response choice compared with the same response choice (M = .57) compared with those who received the male manipulation (M = .74) which indicated no response bias, p < .02.

Conclusions: These results demonstrate advantages of signal detection methodology in examining the unique contribution of signal processing and responses bias in mothers’ response to infants’ affective signaling. The study has identified early differences in maternal response as a function of gender which has implications for the gendered socialization of emotion.

2017 - APSA Annual Meeting & Exhibition Words: 459 words || 
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4. Kim, Seok Joon. "Do Costly Signals Matter? Unifying Theories of Signaling and Perceptions" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the APSA Annual Meeting & Exhibition, TBA, San Francisco, CA, Aug 31, 2017 <Not Available>. 2019-11-14 <http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p1243574_index.html>
Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: Can a state signal its benign or aggressive intentions clearly? Can a state make its signals credible by taking actions that another state, seeking to obscure its real intentions, cannot? These questions are crucial in international security, and their answers are integral to explaining the causes of war and peace. The standard notion of structural realism suggests that even when states attempt to communicate their intentions, information about states’ intentions do not matter because a feature of the international system—namely, anarchy—will drive states to compete with each other regardless of their intentions. By contrast, defensive realists have been more optimistic, largely in suggesting that states can communicate their intentions by taking costly actions and that such information about state intentions matters.
The literature addressing state power and intentions from the realist perspective is limited in two ways. First, there is no realist consensus regarding whether states can make their signals of benign or aggressive intentions credible or whether information about state intentions matters. Second, most international relations studies on signaling tend to be theoretical and deductive rather than empirical and inductive, while largely ignoring decision makers’ subjective or psychological environment or “decision makers’ beliefs about the world and other actors.”
This paper attempts to address these gaps by examining the impact of a signal on different aspects of human cognition and attitudes. To test the logic of costly signals, I use survey experiments. I treat a state’s military actions or diplomatic statements as signals with the potential to reveal state intentions, just as many defensive realists argue. I vary the cost of the signal, or the level of the difficulty of implementing a policy, and examine whether costly signals are perceived to be more credible than less costly ones.
Contrary to defensive and motivational realists’ arguments, in my experiments, the costly signals of a hypothetical adversary intended to reassure others were not perceived as credible. In contrast, the rationalist theory of costly signals effectively predicts observers’ response to those signals that embody the aggressive motives of a state. I argue that those perceiving an adversary’s actions tend to have a conservative bias: they are late in lowering their guard against enemies exhibiting conciliatory gestures and quick in responding to threats (i.e., a strong and aggressive enemy).
I contend that the conservative bias is not necessarily a misperception, but a kind of cognitive mechanism (shortcuts or heuristics) evolved as a strategy to increase the probability of survival. In fact, the human tendency to be more sensitive to negative events may be a “bias” in rationalist terms, but the bias may be “better than rational” for the purpose of survival. (Cosmides and Tooby 1994). I explain people’s seemingly bounded rationality with cognitive psychological or evolutionary psychological explanations at the individual level.

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