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2017 - American Sociological Association Annual Meeting Pages: unavailable || Words: unavailable || 
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1. Shaffer, Jonathan. "Historically Structured Structuring Structures: Bourdieu’s Roots and Implications for Social Theory" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Sociological Association Annual Meeting, Palais des Congrès de Montréal, Montreal, Canada, Aug 12, 2017 Online <PDF>. 2018-09-20 <http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p1252605_index.html>
Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: The construction of social theory is accomplished by people who are embedded in concrete, but complex webs of social, political, and economic relationships. Its roots appear especially problematic when we consider the gender, economic, geographic, and political backgrounds of the “fathers” of modern social theory. Ontologically and epistemologically, early sociologists tended to “reproduce the imperial gaze” by which empires operated, reproducing and reifying stereotypes and systems of power relations within and between social groups. Pierre Bourdieu’s approach to relational sociology has been heralded as a way to obliterate the antimonies and dichotomies that ontologically and epistemologically reproduce power relations through what he would call symbolic violence. In this paper, I seek to explore the classical theoretical roots of Pierre Bourdieu’s thinking, how those theoretical foundations came to inform his ontology of the social and his epistemological approach to social science, and finally I will assess Bourdieu’s potential to give us a “way out” of the colonial-epistemological bind.

2015 - ASEEES Convention Words: 140 words || 
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2. Buckley, Noah. "Structure and Turnover in Hybrid Authoritarian State Structures" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the ASEEES Convention, Philadelphia Marriott Downtown, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, <Not Available>. 2018-09-20 <http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p1019934_index.html>
Publication Type: Panel Paper
Abstract: In this paper I show how relationships between officials and clientelistic ties within the bureaucracy generate patterns of turnover or stability in state cadres. While such ties and patterns are broadly found in all modern states, several characteristics of hybrid authoritarian regimes make the structure of and turnover in the state distinct from those found in democratic or institutionalized authoritarian states. I use a large dataset of officials at the subnational and national level in Russia from 2001-2013 to show these dynamics. The special reliance of hybrid authoritarian regimes on election-oriented dominant parties, incomplete and fractured institutionalization, and the use of flows of rents to manage politics create unique outcomes in these states. I also incorporate analysis of the networks of personal relationships between Russian officials and develop a general characterization of the multifaceted structures of Russian subnational state structures.

2014 - American Sociological Association Annual Meeting Pages: unavailable || Words: 7580 words || 
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3. Tutterow, Craig. "Structural Authority and Market Distortion: A Comparison of Mediated Markets Represented as Network Structures" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Sociological Association Annual Meeting, Hilton San Francisco Union Square and Parc 55 Wyndham San Francisco, San Francisco, CA, Aug 15, 2014 Online <APPLICATION/PDF>. 2018-09-20 <http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p722292_index.html>
Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: Abstract Increasingly, intermediaries act as brokers and arbiters of quality judgments. Intermediaries such as college rankings and review aggregators provide metaknowledge, or a reduced form information about producer quality which serves as a simplifying heuristic and assists outsiders in dealing with complex and/or high stakes decisions. Intermediaries differ in how they collect and distribute information. Likewise, mediated markets differ in the extent to which they are centralized or decentralized. This paper will draw on simulations to detail the effects of five prototypical tripartite network structures and evaluate the influence of intermediary structure on the extent to which quality judgments are agreed upon and accurate in a mediated market. Brokers performing and distributing firsthand research must have large advantages in accuracy over the typical consumer to improve system accuracy over a purely decentralized network structure. On the other hand, review aggregators that compile secondhand accounts of consumer experiences produce sizable improvements in systemic accuracy by connecting consumers to independent perspective that they might not have had access to beforehand.

2003 - American Sociological Association Pages: 41 pages || Words: 10189 words || 
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4. Snellman, Kaisa. and Piskorski, Mikolaj. "Network Structure of Exploitation: Venture Capital Syndicate Structure and Time to IPO" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Sociological Association, Atlanta Hilton Hotel, Atlanta, GA, Aug 16, 2003 Online <.PDF>. 2018-09-20 <http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p107469_index.html>
Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: In this paper we suggest an extension of power dependence theory that yields a different mechanism explaining the performance difference between central and peripheral actors. We argue that central actors will be better off not only because the network structure allows them to receive greater share of rewards than peripheral actors, but also because they can be more selective in terms of the resources they share with others. The inequality mechanism we propose is complementary to the embeddedness and the power dependence explanation of the performance difference between central and peripheral actor. However, this mechanism yields a distinct hypothesis, which we test using data on venture capital investments in the U.S. Using the time a start-up reaches the initial public offering as the measure of venture quality, we find support for the embeddedness and the power dependence explanations of inequality between central and peripheral venture capitalists. However, consistent with the mechanism proposed here, we also find that central venture capitalists keep the best deals to themselves. Start-ups with one central investor have the shortest time to IPO, while start-ups financed by only one peripheral investor take the longest the go public. We discuss the significance of this finding for our understanding of the role of networks in generating inequality between actors.

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