Guest  

 
Search: 
Search By: SubjectAbstractAuthorTitleFull-Text

 

Showing 1 through 5 of 288 records.
Pages: Previous - 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 ... 58 - Next  Jump:
2006 - American Political Science Association Words: unavailable || 
Info
1. Lynch, Michael. "Uncovering Congress: Examining the Uncovered Set Under Bicameral and Supermajoritarian Rules" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Marriott, Loews Philadelphia, and the Pennsylvania Convention Center, Philadelphia, PA, <Not Available>. 2019-04-25 <http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p152978_index.html>
Publication Type: Proceeding

2006 - American Political Science Association Pages: 52 pages || Words: 10961 words || 
Info
2. Peterson, David. "Uncovering the Psychological Mechanism: How Campaigns Matter and Why" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Marriott, Loews Philadelphia, and the Pennsylvania Convention Center, Philadelphia, PA, Aug 31, 2006 <Not Available>. 2019-04-25 <http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p152353_index.html>
Publication Type: Proceeding
Abstract: Two problems, one data-driven one theory driven limit the study of campaign effects. First, it is difficult to separate who voters chose and why from who they would have chosen and why they made that choice had there been no campaign. This is the relevant comparison and most data are simply inappropriate for answering this question because they do not observe how an individual behaved without the campaign. Second, even though we know that campaign effects stem from both persuasion (changing the content of a voter’s attitude ) and heresthetic change or priming (changing the weights applied to or salience of specific determinants of vote choice), there have been nearly no attempts to undercover the underlying psychological mechanisms that lead voters to change which determinants they rely on. In this paper I draw on the recent controversy surrounding the different forms of attitude strength (Miller and Peterson 2004), to suggest that changes in citizens’ uncertainty are the key mediator of campaign effects. The results suggest that persuasion and changes in uncertainty but not ambivalence or importance are responsible for the changes in voters’ decisions during the campaign.

2006 - International Communication Association Pages: 32 pages || Words: 9254 words || 
Info
3. Parmelee, John., Perkins, Stephynie. and Sayre, Judith. "“What About People Our Age?” Using Framing Theory to Uncover How Political Ads Alienate College Students" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Communication Association, Dresden International Congress Centre, Dresden, Germany, Jun 16, 2006 Online <PDF>. 2019-04-25 <http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p90298_index.html>
Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: Focus groups and content analysis were used to examine how political candidates engage college students through their political advertising. Findings indicate that the way in which candidate ads are framed serves to alienate young voters. Political ads fail to connect with students because such ads don’t talk about issues from the perspective of young voters. Recommendations are provided on how to create more student-targeted ads.

2007 - International Studies Association 48th Annual Convention Pages: 35 pages || Words: 11919 words || 
Info
4. Luedtke, Adam. "European Union Immigration Policy Uncovered: Analyzing National Preferences and Supranational Power" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association 48th Annual Convention, Hilton Chicago, CHICAGO, IL, USA, Feb 28, 2007 <Not Available>. 2019-04-25 <http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p179871_index.html>
Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: In recent years the national governments of the European Union (EU) have taken large strides towards developing a common immigration policy. This policy is a startling political development, given that it represents the transfer of a fundamental facet of Westphalian sovereignty (border control) to a supranational body. However, support for such a policy varies widely across countries and across time. Some countries, like the United Kingdom and Denmark, have consistently opposed this development, while other EU countries have welcomed it. From year to year, many countries have even changed positions on the desirability of an EU immigration policy.
Scholars have not put forward theories to explain this variation in national support for a supranational immigration policy. Do national governments respond to predictable influences in changing positions (economics, partisanship), or do we simply observe random or unrelated decisions?
I argue that national opposition or support for an EU immigration policy is a calculated move by executives to increase policy effectiveness. My hypothesis is that national positions on delegating immigration policy to Brussels depend on two factors: the political salience of immigration in that country, and the strength of institutional rights protection for immigrants at the national level. If salience is high, but institutional rights protection is strong, then national executives seek to make policy at EU level in order to dodge these domestic constraints and crack down on immigrant rights. However, if institutional rights protection is weak at national level, then governments have no need of Brussels, and will thus oppose transfers of sovereignty.
To test my hypothesis, I conduct case studies of three countries: France, Belgium and the UK. These countries are chosen based on Mill's method of difference, since Belgium has been one of the strongest supporters of EU control over immigration policy, France has been a middle-ground, shifting case and the UK has been a consistent opponent, refusing to take part in most cooperation. Using participant interviews with policymakers, NGOs and other practitioners and analysts, I attempt to explain the reasons behind these national positions. In addition to testing my argument about political salience and national institutional protections for immigrant rights, I also look at the impact of political partisanship, economics and other potential causal factors.
This analysis captures a surprising development on a very important topic. As the “Europeanization” of immigration policy continues, it is imperative that scholars understand why beleaguered national executives might give up control over immigration, as opposed to guarding sovereignty in this field for the nation-state.

2007 - Midwest Political Science Association Pages: 33 pages || Words: 8142 words || 
Info
5. Hinich, Melvin. and Shaw, Daron. "Uncovering a Reform Dimension in the 2006 U.S. Elections" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Palmer House Hotel, Chicago, IL, Apr 12, 2007 <Not Available>. 2019-04-25 <http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p197738_index.html>
Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: Abstract

Since Downs (1957) and Enelow and Hinich (1984) demonstrated how the spatial positioning of parties and candidates on a single left-right continuum affects political competition, scores of analyses have attempted to verify the relationship between issue or ideological proximity and candidate or party preference. Quite a few analyses, though not as many, have attempted to identify additional dimensions to political competition. Most prominently, there is an array of research suggesting the existence of a “social issue” dimension to electoral competition in the United States. We offer an adaptation of an innovative methodology to test for the existence of multiple competitive dimensions in the 2006 U. S. congressional election. We find not only that a second dimension occurs in 2006, but that it conforms to a reform versus establishment cleavage. Not only does this dimension exist, but it appears to be animated by evaluations of corruption.

Pages: Previous - 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 ... 58 - Next  Jump:

©2019 All Academic, Inc.   |   All Academic Privacy Policy